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The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator
Hilary J. Allen*
It is well established that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has a
mandate to protect investors and to encourage capitalformation, but this Article argues
that the SEC also has another mandate-to promote financial stability. Importantly, this
does not mean that the SEC needs to abandon its traditional identity, or adopt the
regulatory tools and methods deployed by prudentialregulatorslike the FederalReserve.
Instead, this Article argues that the SEC is best suited to promoting the stability of the
financialsystem from a market, rather than a prudential, perspective.
To make this Article's discussion of "SEC as financial stability regulator" more
concrete, it looks in detail at the SEC's approach to high frequency trading-apractice
that is fundamentally changing the structure of the equity markets the SEC oversees. In
particular, this Article analyzes all of the testimony, public statements, and speeches by
SEC commissioners and seniorstaff members on the subject of highfrequency tradingthat
were published between January2010 and January 2017. From a close readingof these
communications, this Article establishes that during this period, financial stability was
indeed a motivating concern of many SEC Commissioners and staff members as they
explored regulatoryreform of highfrequency trading, and equity market structure reform
more generally. This Article therefore concludes by exploring what a financial stabilityminded approach to regulating high frequency trading would look like (and the types of
resources the SEC would need to dischargesuch a task).
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I. INTRODUCTION
After the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (the Crisis), regulators around the world
adopted the pursuit of "financial stability" as one of the foremost goals of financial
regulation.1 However, the ubiquity of the goal belied a lack of consensus about how
regulators should approach financial stability, and that lack of consensus persists today.
This Article takes an expansive view of financial stability regulation, arguing that such
regulation should seek to prevent disruptions to both financial institutions and markets, if
such disruptions would have negative consequences for the broader economy. Because the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has much more experience with the securities
markets than other US financial regulators, the SEC is the agency best positioned to ensure
the robustness of those markets. The SEC can therefore make a significant contribution as
a market-oriented financial stability regulator-even if other forms of financial stability
regulation might be best left to prudential regulators like the Federal Reserve.
Private participants in the securities markets have neither the incentives nor the ability
to promote financial stability (a collective good),2 and so only a government body can work
to ensure that the securities markets are robust to shocks, and minimize the likelihood of
shocks occurring in the first place. If the SEC fails to take on this role, we cannot expect
any other government agency to fill the lacuna. While the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) was created to address threats to the stability of the financial system, it is,
at its core, a committee that is designed to leverage the expertise of its member agencies
rather than performing extensive regulatory functions itself. Other than the SEC, there is
no regulatory agency represented on the FSOC that has extensive experience with the
securities markets. 3 And there are certainly developments in the securities markets that
raise financial stability concerns-this Article will focus in particular on the increasing
prevalence of high frequency trading (HFT) in the equity markets.
HFT is an umbrella term for a variety of different automated trading strategies; their
common characteristic is that the computer algorithms that make the trading decisions are
designed to hold assets for only a very short period of time. HFT now accounts for more
than half of all trading in the U.S. equity markets, 4 and while the practice certainly affords

1.

Hilary J. Allen, What is "FinancialStability?": The Need fbr Some Common Language in International

FinancialRegulation, 45 GEO. J. INT'L L. 929, 930 (2014) [hereinafter Allen, What is FinancialStability].
2. Hilary J. Allen, Puttingthe "FinancialStability" In FinancialStability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1087, 1103 (2015) [hereinafter Allen, FSOC].
3. Id. at 1091. The Chair of the SEC is a member of the FSOC, although admittedly, he or she is not
compelled to represent the consensus view of the other Commissioners in FSOC deliberations-at times, then,

&

the FSOC's deliberations may reflect the personal views and securities expertise of the Chair, rather than the SEC
as an administrative body. Id. at 1118.
4. Austin Gerig, High-Frequency Trading Synchronizes Prices in FinancialMarkets 1, (Div. Econ.
Risk Analysis, SEC, Working Paper, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/working-papers/dera-wp-hft-
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benefits in terms of reducing the time and cost of executing trades, it also increases the
complexity, interconnectedness and opacity of the equities markets. 5 Events such as the
"Flash Crash" in May 2010 have alerted regulators to HFT's potential to both generate and
transmit shocks through the financial system: the potential threats that HFT poses to
financial stability (as well as to investors and capital formation) will be explored in detail
in this Article. Of course, high frequency traders do not trade exclusively in the equity
markets (i.e. the secondary trading markets for listed stocks);6 there is an almost limitless
list of assets that HFT firms will trade, including a multitude of derivatives instruments.
However, this Article will focus on the equity markets.
The SEC is currently considering how to reform its regulation of the equity markets
in light of the rise of HFT and other developments, a project that began in earnest with the
issuance of a "Concept Release on Equity Market Structure" on January 14, 2010 (the
Concept Release). 7 Although some reforms have been implemented since that time, the
project of market structure reform is nowhere near complete. To the extent that the SEC is
planning to promulgate further rules addressing HFT and the equity market structure more
generally, such rules can be said to be in the "preproposal period" (i.e. the time prior to the
proposal of any rule in the Federal Register). As Krawiec notes, the preproposal period is
"a time period about which little is known, despite its importance to policy outcomes ...
the need to produce a proposed rule that is ready for comment pushes much regulatory
work to this early stage of the rule development process." This Article seeks to provide
some insight into the preproposal stage of the market structure reform project by
considering the testimony, public statements, speeches, and press releases that have been
disseminated on the subject of HFT by the SEC, its Commissioners, and its staff.9
The author reviewed and manually coded 107 such documents, all published between
January 2010 and January 2017. A close reading of these speeches, public statements, press
releases, and testimony revealed that the stability of the equity markets was indeed an

synchronizes.pdf.
5.

See infra Part V.

6.

Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594 (Jan. 21, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R.

pt. 242). The SEC does not see this market as including "other types of instruments that are related to equities,

such as options and OTC derivatives." Id. at 3602-03.
7. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. at 3594. Former SEC Chair Mary Schapiro
described market structure as encompassing:
all aspects of the organization of a market, including the number and types of venues that trade a
financial product and the rules by which they operate. Although these issues can be complex and the
rules technical, a fair, orderly and efficient market structure is the backbone of the equity markets

and has significant implications for our financial system more broadly. Monitoring Systemic Risk
and Promoting Financial Stability: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban

Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC).
8.

Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don't "Screw Joe the Plummer": The Sausage-Making ofFinancialReform, 55

ARIz. L. REv. 53, 70-71 (2013).
9. Because this Article's goal is to elucidate the SEC's attitude towards regulating HFT and dark pools, it
does not consider public comments that have been submitted to the SEC in response to the Concept Release on
market structure reform, or in response to notices of proposed rulemakings. Instead, it looks exclusively at the

press releases, public statements, speeches, and testimony issued by Commissioners and staff members of the
SEC.
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important goal for many of those who held key SEC positions between 2010 and 2017.10
Unfortunately, there is no unambiguous legislative directive for the SEC to pursue financial
stability as a regulatory objective, 1 ' and it is therefore quite plausible that under the Trump
administration, the SEC might abandon the concern for market stability that was expressed
during the Obama administration. Such a course of action would be highly problematic: if
the SEC were to choose not to address financial stability concerns, this would leave the
financial system as a whole more exposed to systemic risks posed and propagated by the
equity markets. This Article, therefore, urges the SEC to continue to focus on financial
stability in general, and the threats that HFT poses to financial stability in particular-while
also recognizing that this focus on financial stability will need to be balanced to some
degree with the potentially competing mandates of protecting individual investors and
promoting the formation of capital in the short-term.
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows. Part II will introduce the key
concept of "financial stability," and its various interpretations. Part III will then articulate
why and how the SEC should act as a financial stability regulator. Part III's argument is
reasonably high-level and abstract: the remainder of the Article situates the theoretical
argument in a more concrete context by considering how the SEC can promote financial
stability through its market structure reform project. Part IV discusses the market structure
regulation that has been implemented to date, then Part V elaborates on HFT: a major
structural change to the equities markets with which the SEC is grappling. Part V considers
the issues raised by HFT through the lenses of investor protection, capital formation, and
financial stability before analyzing the SEC's communications on the subject. Encouraged
by the depth of commitment to financial stability evinced in these communications, Part
VI considers some of the implications that flow from the SEC adopting a proactive
financial stability perspective when regulating HFT. Part VII concludes.
II. FINANCIAL STABILITY REGULATION
Despite the ubiquity of the term "financial stability," there remains a surprising lack
of clarity about what "financial stability regulation" is seeking to achieve.12 Some might
assume that "financial stability" connotes stasis and ossification of the financial marketsadherents of such a viewpoint might resist financial stability regulation as seeking to freeze
all risk-taking within the financial system. However, this Article argues that a stable
financial system can still be dynamic, and, indeed, participants within that stable financial
system can and should falter at times: "[d]isturbances in financial markets or at individual
financial institutions need not be considered threats to financial stability if they are not
expected to damage economic activity at large. In fact, the incidental closing of a financial
institution, a rise in asset-price volatility, and sharp and even turbulent corrections in
financial markets may be the result of competitive forces, the efficient incorporation of
new information, and the economic system's self-correcting and self-disciplining
mechanisms." 1 3 Financial stability regulation is implicated only to the extent that problems

10.
11.

See infra Part V.F.
See infra Part Ill.B.

12.

Allen, What is FinancialStability, supra note 1, at 929.

13.

Gary J. Schinasi, Defining Financial Stability 7 (IMF, Working Paper No. 04/187, 2004),
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with the financial industry have the potential to harm the broader economy.
Others treat financial stability as synonymous with the avoidance of systemic risk.
However, as I have argued in the past, the concepts of "financial stability" and "systemic
risk" are not simply two sides of the same coin. A narrow consideration of systemic risk
can limit regulatory focus to the financial industry itself, whereas a concern for financial
stability indicates a focus both on and beyond the financial industry. 14 To elaborate, Steven
Schwarcz has proffered one of the most cited definitions of "systemic risk," which he
defines as:
the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers
(through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or
institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii)
resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often
evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility. 15
Financial stability regulation is certainly concerned with the markets, institutions, and
capital that Schwarcz refers to in his definition of systemic risk, but financial stability
regulation should not end its inquiry there. Financial stability regulation should focus
attention on the impact that the failure of such markets and institutions (and resulting
disruption of capital intermediation) could have on participants in the broader, nonfinancial economy.16 To reflect this broader focus and purpose, I have defined financial
stability as:
a state of affairs wherein (i) financial institutions and markets are able to facilitate
capital intermediation, risk management and payment services in a way that
enables sustainable economic growth; (ii) there is no disruption to the ability of
financial institutions or markets to carry out such functions that might cause harm
to persons (wherever they may be resident) who are not customers or
counterparties of those financial institutions, nor participants in those financial
markets; and (iii) financial institutions and markets are able to withstand
economic shocks (such as the failure of other markets and institutions, or a chain
of significant loses at financial institutions) so that (x) there will be no disruption
to the performance of the functions set forth in (i) and (y) no harm will be caused
to the persons set forth in (ii).1 7
Prior to 2008, prudential regulators like the Federal Reserve and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency generally sought to preserve financial stability by promoting

https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04187.pdf

14.
15.

Id.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).

16.

It should be noted that definitions of systemic risk are not uniform. Concern for the broader economy

is expressly referenced in some other definitions of systemic risk, such as the one proffered in a report to the G20
by the IMF, BIS, and FSB, which "defines systemic risk as a risk of disruption to financial services that is (i)
caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative
consequences for the real economy." Financial Stability Board, Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of
FinancialInstitutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations, BANK INT'L SETTLEMENTS 2 (Oct.

2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf.
17. Allen, What is FinancialStability, supra note 1, at 932.
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the "safety and soundness" of individual banks. The assumption undergirding pre-Crisis
prudential regulation was that if each bank were individually safe and sound, then the
system as a whole would be strong and nourish the broader economy. 19 Limited attention
was paid to the broader system of interconnected relationships and markets within which
banks and other financial institutions operated,20 but the inadequacies of such a
"microprudential" approach to regulation became glaringly obvious during the Financial
Crisis. During that period, stressed financial institutions tried to preserve their individual
safety and soundness by selling off assets, but the resulting downward pressure on asset
prices harmed other institutions and ultimately undermined the stability of the financial
system as a whole.21 As a result, prudential regulators have started to embrace a more
"macroprudential" focus since the Financial Crisis. Instead of focusing solely on "the
financial conditions of individual institutions in isolation," prudential regulators now strive
22
to "to encompass consideration of potential systemic risks and weaknesses as well."
A shift to macroprudential regulation requires regulators to be more attuned to the
markets and other interconnections that link financial institutions, not just banks, and could
potentially transmit risks amongst them. Shifting approach is easier said than done,
however. The Federal Reserve still tends to approach financial regulation with "bank-tinted
lenses,"23 and as Hellwig has noted, if such regulation "is approached with the traditional
tools of either central bankers or microprudential supervisors, there is a danger of falling
into a routine of ticking off items on a dash board without seeing what is actually going on.
We must recognize that systemic risk transcends the scope of macroeconomic modelling

18. Traditional prudential regulation has been described as being "aimed at preventing the costly failure of
individual institutions." Samuel G. Hanson et al., A MacroprudentialApproach to FinancialRegulation, 25 J.
ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2011). The GAO has described "safety and soundness" regulation as referring to: "a broad
range of issues that relate to the health of a financial institution, including capital requirements, risk management,
the quality and diversification of an institution's portfolio, liquidity and funds management, and adequate
procedures for internal controls. To achieve their safety and soundness goals, regulators establish capital
requirements and conduct on-site examinations and off-site monitoring to assess an institution's financial
condition, operational security, and governance, and monitor compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and
guidance. Regulators also take enforcement actions, and those who charter institutions may close them based on
statutory grounds that include insolvency, illiquidity, and unsafe and unsound condition to transact business.",
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-175, FINANCIAL REGULATION: COMPLEX AND FRAGMENTED
STRUCTURE COULD BE STREAMLINED TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS 10 (2016) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].

19. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Implementing a Macroprudential
Approach
to
Supervision
and
Regulation
(May
5,
2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bemanke20110505a.pdf.
20. Id.
21. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Decipheringthe Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008,23 J. ECON. PERSP.
77, 92 (2009).
22. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City's Annual Economic Symposium: Reducing Systemic Risk (Aug. 22, 2008),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke2008O822a.htm.
23. Allen, FSOC, supra note 2, at 1122. In a similar vein, Elliott notes that "[d]ecision-makers at the Fed
would be only human if they relied excessively on the tools with which they were already familiar." Douglas J.
Elliott, Regulating Systemically Important FinancialInstitutions ThatAre Not Banks, BROOKINGS (May 9, 2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/regulating-systemically-important-financial-institutions-that-are-notbanks/.
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as well as the supervisors' assessments of individual institutions."24 In other words, new
and complementary perspectives are needed to successfully discharge macroprudential
regulation, avoid systemic risk, and promote financial stability.
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has argued in the
wake of the Financial Crisis that securities regulators have unique perspectives and
experience in maintaining the integrity of the securities markets, and as such should be
actively involved in trying to reduce systemic risk and promote financial stability. 25
Systemic risks associated with markets are arguably "more diffuse and difficult to tackle"
than those arising from individual institutions,26 and looking at these types of risks may
come more naturally to securities regulators than to prudential regulators who have
traditionally focused on institutions.27 In particular, IOSCO has argued that securities
regulators should prioritize the stable and continuing provision of market liquidity, which
can evaporate if pricing information is compromised, or if transactions can't be executed
in an orderly manner.
The participation of securities regulators in financial stability regulation is particularly
necessary in the United States, because of its byzantine financial regulatory architecture.
There is no one single U.S. regulatory agency charged with financial stability regulation;
instead, the Dodd-Frank legislation enacted in the wake of the Crisis created the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC),29 which is a council of the heads of the many federal
financial regulatory agencies, and charged it with "identify[ing] risks to the financial
stability of the United States" and "respond[ing] to emerging threats to the financial
stability of the United States." 30 Because the FSOC has limited resources and powers of
its own, it can only function effectively if it is able to leverage the expertise of the agencies
led by its members, which include the Chair of the SEC. 3 1 Although the Treasury
24.

Martin Hellwig, Financial Stability and Monetary Policy, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR RES. ON

COLLECTIvE GOODS 17 (Aug. 2015), https://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf dat/2015-10online.pdf.
25. Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, Mitigating Systemic
Risk: A Role fbr Securities Regulators 3 (IOSCO, Discussion Paper No. ORO/1/1 1, 2011) [hereinafter "IOSCO
Systemic Risk Report"].
26. Id. at 12. Much of IOSCO's report addressed the risks posed by non-bank financial institutions
(including mutual funds): without underestimating the importance of such risks, they (and the prudential and

governance rules that apply to them) will not be the focus of this Article.
27. Id. at 37.
28. Id. Market liquidity has been defined as "the cost-both in expense and time-of buying or selling an
asset for cash." Funding liquidity, being "the ability of a financial entity to raise cash by borrowing" can be
conceptually distinguished from market liquidity, although a failure of market liquidity will necessarily affect
funding liquidity, and vice versa. William C. Dudley, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2016 Financial Markets Conference: Market and Funding Liquidity: An
Overview (May 1, 2016) [hereinafter Dudley, Market and Funding Liquidity]. While equally vital to financial
stability, funding liquidity tends to fall under the purview of prudential regulators rather than securities regulators.
29. Dodd-Frank Act § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012). The Treasury Secretary, the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Chair of the FDIC, the Director of the CFPB, the Chair of the SEC,

the Chair of the CFTC, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Chair of the National Credit
Union Administration Board are all voting members of the FSOC, as is an independent insurance expert. The
FSOC also has five non-voting members: the Director of the Office of Financial Research, the Director of the
Federal Insurance Office, and representative state banking, insurance and securities commissioners.

30.
31.

Dodd-Frank Act § 112(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2012).
Allen, FSOC, supra note 2, at 1152.
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Department and Federal Reserve have tended to take the lead in driving the FSOC's
agenda,32 neither they, nor any other agency, represented on the FSOC has jurisdiction
over (or significant experience overseeing) the securities markets. Because private
participants in the securities markets have neither the incentives nor the information
necessary to detect and defuse systemic risks on their own, 33 without the active
participation of the SEC, there would be a significant hole in the FSOC's understanding
and oversight of systemic risks posed and propagated by the equity markets (as well as the
markets for debt securities, mutual funds, and some derivatives, which are not the focus of
this paper but are within the SEC's jurisdiction).
To be clear, although this Article argues that the SEC need not approach financial
stability regulation from a prudential perspective, the Article is not intended as a critique
of prudential regulation more generally. Prudential regulation of individual financial
institutions remains a vital component of financial stability regulation, and I have
previously argued that the optimal regulatory structure for financial stability regulation in
the United States would involve the creation of a single prudential regulator with a robust
financial stability mandate and jurisdiction over all financial institutions, including those
that are currently overseen by the SEC. 34 However, our political realities ensure that such
ambitious reforms remain (at least for now) a pipe dream. 35 Within our existing financial
regulatory structure, prudential regulation should be left to the prudential regulators, and if
there are financial institutions currently regulated by the SEC that would pose systemic
risks if they failed, the FSOC's designation power may ultimately need to be invoked to
allow the Federal Reserve to regulate such institutions.36 A detailed discussion of the
FSOC's designation power is beyond the scope of this Article, however. Instead, this
Article is focused on the market regulation component of financial stability regulation, to
which the SEC is best suited.
III. THE SEC AND FINANCIAL STABILITY REGULATION
Given the lack of clarity about what financial stability regulation entails (which has
sometimes produced disagreement about whether the SEC should engage in financial
stability regulation at all), 37 this Part seeks to outline the contours of what a financial
stability mandate might mean for the SEC. First, this Part will introduce the SEC as an
32.

Id. at ll21-28.

33.

Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 977, 1043

(2015).
34.
35.
36.

Allen, FSOC, supranote 2, at 1138.
Id.
For a discussion of the FSOC's designation power, see id. at 1115. Many of the largest broker/dealers

regulated by the SEC are already subject to some prudential regulation by the Federal Reserve (even without

invoking the designation power), because the parent companies of those broker/dealers are financial holding
companies over whom the Federal Reserve has jurisdiction.
37. "There are different views of whether the SEC should be a systemic risk regulator at all, and systemic
risk can mean a lot of different things to a lot of different people." Conversation with Mary Jo White, Chair of
the SEC, in The Future of the Securities and Exchange Commission in a Changing World, AM. ASSEMBLY 20
(May 1, 2015),
http://americanassembly.org/sites/default/files/downloadlevents/the-futureofthe secjina-changingworld.p

df.
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agency, then outline some of the skirmishes it has had with the FSOC about financial
stability regulation. After concluding that the SEC should not be forced to act as a
prudential regulator (as the FSOC has sometimes encouraged it to do), this Part argues that
the SEC has the legislative authority to, and should, engage in a type of market-based
financial stability regulation that is better suited to the SEC's traditional areas of expertise.
However, this Part also recognizes the political challenges associated with financial
stability regulation: not least of these is that the SEC has many competing demands on its
time and resources.38 This Part therefore concludes with some thoughts on how the SEC
should balance financial stability regulation with its other mandates.
A. The SEC as FinancialStability Regulator
The SEC was founded in 1934, as part of the package of New Deal legislation
emanating from the Roosevelt White House. It is, as its name suggests, a commissioncomprised of five presidential appointees each serving five-year terms, with a requirement
that no more than three commissioners identify with a particular political party. 39 The
President appoints one of the commissioners as Chair, and that Chair has significant
influence over the direction of the agency through his or her discretion regarding staffing
and allocation of resources. 40 The following table sets out the names of the SEC Chairs
and Commissioners who held office between January 2010 and January 2017
(communications disseminated by these Commissioners will be discussed in Part V.E):41

38. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the InstitutionalizationofSecuritiesMarkets, 95
VA. L. REV. 1025, 1028-29 (2009) [hereinafter Langevoort, Retail Investors].
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2018).
40. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in the Face of
Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1597 (2006) [hereinafter Langevoort, SEC as a Lawmaker].
and
Commissioners,
SEC,
Summary
of
Chairmen
41. SEC
Historical
https://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
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Name:
Kathleen
Casey
Elisse Walter
Luis Aguilar
Troy Paredes
Mary
Schapiro
Daniel
Gallagher
Mary Jo
White
Kara Stein
Michael
Piwowar
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Commissioner

Appointment
Effective:
7/17/06

Appointment
Ended:
8/5/11

Democrat
Republican
Independent

Commissioner
Chair
Commissioner
Commissioner
Chair

7/9/08
12/15/12
7/31/08
8/1/08
1/27/09

8/9/13
4/9/13
12/31/15
8/3/13
12/14/12

Republican

Commissioner

11/7/11

10/2/15

Independent

Chair

4/10/13

1/20/17

Democrat
Republican

Commissioner
Commissioner
(Acting Chair
from January,
20, 2017-May
4, 2017)

8/9/13
8/15/13

Party
Affiliation:
Republican
Democrat

Title

As currently structured, the SEC has a number of divisions: most relevant for this
Article are the Enforcement Division and the Trading and Markets Division
(communications disseminated by senior staff members from these divisions will also be
discussed in Part V.E.).42
The SEC's core functions are very different from the core functions of prudential
regulators like the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The
GAO recently described the functions of securities regulation as follows:
Much of the regulation of the securities markets (i.e., debt and equities markets)
focuses on integrity of the capital-raising process for companies, resolving
conflicts of interest in that process, and requiring full disclosure of material
information in order to protect investors and other market users. The prices of
stocks traded on the exchanges are generally not regulated; rather, the
organization and membership of the exchanges and trading activities are
regulated in an attempt to prevent fraud, maintain the integrity of the markets,
protect investors, and facilitate capital formation . . . Oversight also includes the

establishment and maintenance of standards for fair, orderly, and efficient
markets; the facilitation of prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of
securities transactions; and the safeguarding of securities and funds. As such,
securities market participants, including broker-dealers, self-regulatory
organizations (such as stock exchanges and clearing agencies), and transfer
agents, are regulated. 4 3

42.
43.

Divisions and Offices, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/divisions.shtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
GAO REPORT, supra note 18, at 10.
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To paraphrase former SEC Commissioner Gallagher, prudential regulation seeks to
avoid the failure of institutions, while securities regulation seeks to encourage risk-taking,
and puts in place procedures to manage inevitable failures.44 This is, of course, something
of an over-simplification: the SEC is committed to preventing the failure of institutions
that provide critical market infrastructure like the Depository Trust Company (the Federal
Reserve also has jurisdiction over these corporations as "designated financial market
utilities"). 45 However, the SEC has not typically been concerned with promoting the
stability of individual client-facing institutions.46 Notwithstanding this difference between
the securities and prudential approaches to regulation of institutions, to the extent that
securities regulation is intended to ensure that the markets remain robust to shocks and can
continue to facilitate the flow of capital and broader economic growth, it is also a type of
47
financial stability regulation.
As such, the SEC can make a contribution to financial stability in its capacity as a
regulator of markets, even if it does not want to police the solvency of most individual
financial institutions. Certainly, there has been some positive collaboration between the
SEC and the other members of the FSOC with regard to the promotion of financial stability
since the FSOC was established in 2010.48 In a recent report on the U.S. financial
regulatory structure, the GAO noted that "[m]ember agencies . . . generally stated that
participation in the Systemic Risk Committee and other FSOC activities helped them build
informal communication channels and good working relationships among staff across the
agencies, which was not always common before the creation of the FSOC and the
committee". 49 However, collaboration is still impeded (at least to some degree) by
conflicting data sharing policies amongst the various financial regulatory agencies.50

44. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'r, SEC, The Philosophies of Capital Requirements (Jan. 15, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spehO 11514dmg.
45. Designated Financial Market Utilities, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/designated-fmuabout.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
Financial market utilities (FMUs) are multilateral systems that provide the infrastructure for
transferring, clearing, and settling payments, securities, and other financial transactions among
financial institutions or between financial institutions and the system. In cases where, among other

things, a failure or a disruption to the functioning of an FMU could create, or increase, the risk of
significant liquidity or credit problems spreading among financial institutions or markets and thereby
threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system, the FMU may be designated as systemically
important by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Council).Id
46.

See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (noting that the SEC has appeared ill-suited for prudential

regulation).
47. Allen, FSOC, supra note 2, at 1099.
48.

Commissioner Stein, for example, noted that:

The Commission needs to be a helpful contributor to the FSOC . .. We should embrace our fellow
regulators' efforts and work to improve them. We do not lose power as an agency by working with
other regulators, we leverage it. We gain knowledge and expertise in new areas. And other regulators

gain knowledge and expertise by working collaboratively with us. Kara M. Stein, Comm'r, SEC,
Remarks
at
the
"SEC
Speaks"
Conference
(Feb.
21,
2014),
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1 370540830487.
49.
50.

GAO REPORT, supranote 18, at 69.
Id. at 72-73.
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Furthermore, the relationship between the Treasury- and Federal Reserve-dominated
FSOC and the SEC has been fraught at.times-particularly when the FSOC has urged the
SEC to implement increased prudential regulation of mutual funds.
The SEC is the primary regulator of mutual funds,5 1 but the SEC Commissioners were
unable to come to an agreement about how to regulate money market mutual funds postcrsis.52 As a result (and with the approval of then-SEC Chair Schapiro), the FSOC
proposed making recommendations to the SEC in November 2012 "regarding three
possible avenues of reform of [money market mutual funds], indicating that any of those
reforms would help mitigate the dangers that MMFs pose to financial stability." 53 Instead
of accepting those recommendations, the SEC Commissioners proposed their own rule
"that covered two potential avenues for reform, but each of these two avenues was on a
much more limited scale than any of the FSOC's proposals." 54 On another occasion, in
December 2014, the FSOC issued a Notice Seeking Comment on Asset Management
Products and Activities that stated while the SEC "is undertaking several initiatives that
would apply to investment companies and investment advisers regulated by the SEC and
may address some of the risks described in this Notice . . . the SEC's initiatives are not
specifically focused on financial stability." 55 In response, Chair White implied that while
the SEC can provide a market perspective to the FSOC's efforts, the systemic risk posed
by investment companies is outside of the SEC's regulatory scope.56 Later in 2016-when
the FSOC identified a number of systemic risks associated with mutual funds and other
asset management businesses and made some recommendations for addressing such
risks 5 7 SEC Chair Mary Jo White issued a public statement that the FSOC's
recommendations "should not be read as an indication of the direction that the SEC's final
asset management rules may take." 58

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Mutual funds must register with the SEC pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (2018).
Allen, FSOC, supra note 2, at 1119.
Id. at 1118-19.
Id.
Asset Management Products and Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,488, 77,489 (FSOC Dec. 24, 2014) (notice

seeking comment).

56.

Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at The New York Times DealBook Opportunities for Tomorrow

Conference Held at One World Trade Center, New York, N.Y.: Enhancing Risk Monitoring and Regulatory

Safeguards for the Asset Management Industry (Dec. 11, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/ 370543677722#.VKy7Slu6l UQ.
Truly tackling systemic risk in any area, obviously, demands a broader program than one agency can
execute. Systemic risks cannot be addressed alone-they are, after all, 'systemic.' Risks that could
cascade through our financial system could have an impact on a range of market participants, many

of which we do not oversee. The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) is an important forum
for studying and identifying systemic risks across different markets and market participants. The

market perspective that the SEC brings is an essential component of FSOC's efforts. And FSOC's
current review of the potential risks to the stability of U.S. financial system of asset managers is a
complement to the work we are now undertaking.1d.
57.

Update on Review ofAsset Management Productsand Activities, FSOC (Aug. 27, 2015),

https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/news/Documents/FSOC%20Update%20on%20Review/2of%20Ass
et%20Management%2OProducts%20and%2OActivities.pdf.
58. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Statement on Financial Stability Oversight Council's Review of Asset
Management Products and Activities (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/white-statement-
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Rhetoric from Commissioners Gallagher and Piwowar regarding the FSOC has gone
even further-some of their public statements have been openly antagonistic. Gallagher
has commented that "[flor the past several years, banking regulators and others have
attempted to graft their systemic risk mandate on to the SEC's own or otherwise dragoon
the agency into the already broad group of systemic risk regulators. This is as unwise as it
is impractical."59 Gallagher also stated that "the move to impose prudential regulation on
our capital markets, in particular by applying a one-size-fits-all approach to capital
requirements, is nothing short of an existential threat to those markets-and to the SEC
itself."60 Piwowar has used choice epithets like "The Bully Pulpit of Failed Prudential
Regulators" and a "Vast Left Wing Conspiracy to Hinder Capital Formation" to describe
the FSOC, and unambiguously stated his commitment "to defend our jurisdiction from the
prudential regulators' [FSOC]-enabled turf war." 61 While this level of antipathy towards
the FSOC may be unjustified, it is true that-in many respects-attempts by the broader
financial regulatory community to force the SEC to serve as a prudential regulator seem to
be forcing a square peg into a round hole.62 The SEC has not demonstrated much affinity
or aptitude for prudential regulation in the past63 (with the SEC's Consolidated Supervised
Entities program being a notable and disastrous attempt).64 Instead, the SEC's main
contribution to financial stability regulation should reflect its expertise as a regulator of
markets.
It is very difficult to articulate a concrete job description for a financial stability
regulator. One of the better formulations comes from Hellwig, who notes that such
regulators should be asking themselves "how different developments fit together and where
the unseen risks might be hidden."65 This is in many respects a data-driven task. As a UK
government report noted, "the practical assessment and management of financial systemic
risk ... must 'work back from the data' and account for the likely actions and reactions of
041816.html.
59.
Markets

Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'r., SEC, Remarks to the Georgetown University Center for Financial
Policy
and
Conference
on
Financial
Markets
Quality
(Sept.
16,
2014),

https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spchO916l4dmg.html

[hereinafter

Gallagher, Remarks

to

the

Georgetown University Center].

60.

Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'r., SEC, The Importance of the SEC's Rulemaking Agenda-You Are

What You Prioritize: Remarks at the 47th Annual Securities Regulation Seminar of the Los Angeles County Bar

Association (Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/ 1370543283858 [hereinafter
Gallagher, SEC's Rulemaking Agenda].
61. Michael S. Piwowar, Comm'r., SEC, Remarks at AEI Conference on Financial Stability (July 15,2014),
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542309109.
62.

Coffee and Sale note that "it is open to question whether capital adequacy regulation would ever become

a major priority for the SEC. By culture and philosophy, the SEC is a disclosure regulator, whose concerns with
risk and leverage are normally satisfied once full disclosure is made." John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale,
Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 777-78 (2009).
63. Robert B. Thompson, The SEC After the FinancialMeltdown: Social Control Over Finance?, 71 U.
PITT. L. REV. 567, 569 (2010). See Coffee Jr. & Sale, supra note 62, at 775 (explaining at best, "prudential
supervision has been only a secondary responsibility" for the SEC).
64. In 2004, the SEC "put into place its 'consolidated supervised entity' ('CSE') framework, which allowed
broker-dealers and their holding companies to elect to be subject to SEC supervision with respect to capital
adequacy on a group-wide basis voluntarily. The SEC recently abandoned the CSE program, conceding its

failure." Coffee Jr. & Sale, supranote 62, at 776.
65.

Hellwig, supra note 24, at 20.
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market participants."66 With its broad and ongoing oversight over the equity markets, the
SEC is positioned to be the first to see new and unanticipated types of risks developing in
the data it collects from those markets. It can then communicate these risks to the other
members of the FSOC, and also take steps to propose and refine SEC rules relating to data
disclosure, business conduct, and emergency measures, in an attempt to mitigate nascent
systemic risks.67 The SEC therefore has an important role to play as a financial stability
regulator, albeit not in the mold of a traditional prudential regulator. The next Part will
make the argument that the SEC also has the legal authority to play such a role.
B. Legislative Basisfor the SEC's FinancialStability Mandate
The SEC has two clear legislative mandates: protecting investors, and promoting
capital formation.68 The words "investor protection" and "protection of investors" have
been sprinkled liberally through the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act since
their enactment in the 1930s, and amendments made in 1996 to Section 2 of the Securities
Act and Section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act enshrine the dual mandate by requiring
the SEC to consider "whether the action will romote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation" (as well as investor protection).7 There is, however, no express mention of
financial stability in the Securities Act or Securities Exchange Act.
Support for a financial stability mandate can nonetheless be found in the oft-ignored
language of Section 2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This provision reflects the
context for the enactment of the securities laws-a response to the stock market crash of
1929 and ensuing Great Depression 71-and explains that the securities laws were enacted
in part to promote the stability of the broader financial system, in the interests of economic
wellbeing:
... transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges
and over-the-counter markets are effected with a national public interest which
makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and
of practices and matters related thereto . . . in order to protect interstate

66. Sir Mark Walport, FinTech Futures: The UK as a World Leader in FinancialTechnologies, UK
GOV'T OFF. FOR SCL 48 (2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/413095/gs-1 5-3-fintechfutures.pdf. Dombalagian also notes that "[t]o monitor financial stability, regulators must be able to gather and
analyze information from an even broader range of sources in order to identify conditions that may forewarn
economic shock or the cascading failure of institutions". Onnig H. Dombalagian, Preserving Human Agency in
Automated Compliance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & CoM. L. 71, 80 (2016) [hereinafter Dombalagian,
PreservingHuman Agency].
67. IOSCO has noted that securities regulators seeking to promote systemic stability have the following
regulatory methods at their disposal: "measures to increase transparency, business conduct rules, organisational,
prudential and governance requirements and emergency powers." IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 25,
at 4.
68. Abraham J.B. Cable, MadMoney: Rethinking PrivatePlacements, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2253,2263
(2014).
69. Michael D. Guttentag, Protectionfrom What? Investor Protectionand The JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS

BUS. L.J. 207, 212 (2013).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(b) (1933); 78c(f) (1934), as amended by Section 106 ofNSMIA.
71.

MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 47-49 (West Academic, 2016).
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commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and make
more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve System ...
National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the
dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate
commerce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified,
and prolonged by . . sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices . .
and to meet such emergencies the Federal Government is put to such great
expense as to burden the national credit. 72

This Part recognizes the impact that "sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security
prices" (excessive volatility, in today's parlance) can have on the banking system, and by
extension, employment and the broader economy. It also recognizes that government
intervention may need to be invoked ex post to address emergencies stemming from such
volatility. Modern day regulatory efforts to promote financial stability, and avoid such
negative outcomes, are consistent with this Section 2.
In addition, the SEC's efforts to promote the stability of the securities markets can be
conceptualized as a type of indirect investor protection, and thus as authorized by Section
2 of the Securities Act and Section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act. I have previously
argued that, because investors "are-collectively-hurt more by the economic disruptions
that follow a financial crisis than they are from individual instances of misconduct",
promoting financial stability is the best way for the SEC to protect the interests of investors
as a cohort. 73
Finally, some of the provisions in Dodd-Frank provide further legislative support for
a financial stability mandate for the SEC. For example, Section 112(b) of Dodd-Frank
requires each voting member of the FSOC (of whom the SEC Chair is one) to submit an
annual statement to Congress outlining what they see as threats to financial stability-this
serves as an implicit direction to the SEC to monitor the financial system for such threats.
Section 113 of Dodd-Frank implicitly directs the SEC to consider whether the financial
institutions within its purview are systemically significant enough to warrant designation
as requiring heightened supervision by the Federal Reserve. Section 120 of Dodd-Frank
also implicitly directs the SEC "to monitor potentially problematic financial activities or
practices, to enable [it] to determine whether the FSOC should make a recommendation to
apply new or heightened standards or safeguards to such activities or practices."74
C. Competing Mandates
In pursuing any regulatory reform project, the SEC is required by law to consider both
"investor protection" and "capital formation",75 which are often seen as competing and
distinct regulatory ends that need to be "balanced". 76 This Article argues that financial

72.

15 U.S.C. § 78b(3)-(4) (1934).

73.

Hilary J. Allen, FinancialStability Regulation as Indirect Investor Consumer Protection Regulation:

Implicationsfor Regulatory Mandates and Structure, 90 TUL. L. REv. 1113, 1114 (2016) [hereinafter Allen,
Mandates and Structure].

74.

Allen, FSOC, supra note 2, at 1129.

75.

See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.

76.

Cable, supra note 68, at 2258; "[O]pen-ended, potentially conflicting mandates have left regulators
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stability is also a responsibility of the SEC, which will further complicate the SEC's
calculus. However, it is important to note that investor protection, capital formation and
financial stability are not always-perhaps not even usually-orthogonal concepts. 77 For
example, the SEC often seeks to protect individual investors by implementing and
enforcing anti-fraud rules that prevent intermediaries and the providers of market
infrastructure from taking advantage of such investors.7 8 However, investors are also
protected, as a cohort, if the securities markets are functioning smoothly. 79 By inspiring
confidence, smoothly functioning markets also encourage investors to participate in those
markets, and thus financial stability also contributes to capital formation. Protections that
reassure individual investors that they will be afforded a level informational playing field,
and be protected from unscrupulous conduct by other market actors, also inspire confidence
and encourage capital formation. 81
Clearly, then, there is no bright line that can be drawn between efforts to promote
investors, efforts to promote capital formation and efforts to promote financial stability.
Efforts to support one end may be salutary for the other ends as well. There are nonetheless
conflicts that can arise between the different goals. Perhaps the most obvious conflict is
that regulation that seeks to protect investors and/or financial stability can hamper capital
formation by imposing costs on the issuers of securities and other market participants.
Another, more nuanced, example of potential conflict between mandates might involve the
disclosure of information: while disclosure has always been a linchpin of the SEC's
investor protection efforts,82 the goal of financial stability may sometimes be best served
by discouraging transparency (for example, halting the release of information that would
83
damage market confidence in a time of panic). Mandated transparency can also hamper

without clear guidance as to how to balance the costs and benefits of regulatory policy." ONNIG H.
DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE: INFORMATION LAW AND POLICY IN CAPITAL MARKETS 21 (2015)
[hereinafter DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE].
77. "Obviously, each of these mandates is intertwined with the others-investors are better protected when
markets are fair and orderly; markets are more orderly and efficient when investors have access to honest brokers
and accurate information; and capital formation is more efficient when markets are functioning smoothly and
investors are confident." Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the National Conference of the Society
of
Corporate
Secretaries
and
Governance
Professionals
(July
9,
2010),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spchO7O9IOmls.htm [Schapiro, Corporate Secretaries and Governance

Professionals].
78.
79.

Guttentag, supra note 69, at 223-24.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.

80. Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style
and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 999 (2006).
81.

IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 25, at 13; Tamar Frankel, Regulation and Investors' Trust in

the Securities Markets, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 439, 444 (2002); Guttentag, supra note 69, at 218.
82.

Guttentag, supra note 69, at 209;

83. For example, New York Federal Reserve President William Dudley has noted "disclosing in real time
who was borrowing from the Federal Reserve's Discount Window would likely undercut the efficacy of the
window. Banks might be reluctant to borrow if it were immediately made public because such borrowing might
be construed in the market as a sign of weakness. Stigmatizing Discount Window use by banks would make this

tool less effective as a lender of last resort backstop for bank liquidity needs." William C. Dudley, The Role of
the FederalReserve: Lessonsfrom FinancialCrises, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr.

12, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/04/12/the-role-of-the-federal-reserve-lessons-from-financialcrises/.
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capital formation if it dissuades investors from trading large blocks of securities (such
investors often fear that if their large buy or sell orders are made public, the market may
move against the trade and make it more costly to execute). 84 Less transparency may
therefore improve liquidity and efficiency in the equities markets in some circumstances.
When mandates conflict, the SEC must choose which one to prioritize. Ultimately,
the choice of primary mandate can be conceptualized as preferring one particular
constituency to others: to the extent that the SEC decides to prioritize investor protection
over other conflicting ends, it is focusing on the direct protection of individual investors in
the securities markets from information asymmetries and misleading practices.85
Alternatively, if financial stability is the ultimate goal, then the desired regulatory outcome
is the sustained growth of the broader economy (being the economy beyond the financial
industry) 8 6-both retail and institutional investors benefit from this type of regulatory goal
in the long run, but they are protected indirectly, and some individual investors may suffer
from an approach that is more focused on avoiding collective harm to investors and noninvestors alike, rather than on avoiding harm to any one single investor or category of
investors. When capital formation is the primary goal of regulation, efficiency-in the
sense that "the aggregate economic benefits exceed the aggregate economic costs, even
though some market participants may be forced to bear costs on net while others reap
benefits on net" 8 7 -is prioritized above all else, and there is little concern for how capital
is distributed.88 As such, a regulatory system with an unalloyed focus on efficiency and
capital formation would not be troubled by a securities market ecosystem that benefits
industry participants while contributing little to the non-financial economy.
While there will certainly be situations where it makes sense for the SEC to emphasize
capital formation or the protection of individual investors, financial instability can be
enormously costly for macroeconomic growth-and therefore for society in general.89 As
such, financial stability is the normative regulatory goal designed to benefit the broadest
group of people. As I have explored previously, prioritizing financial stability over other
regulatory goals is an inherently precautionary exercise, which entails rejecting strict
criteria of efficiency (including quantified cost-benefit analysis) as the primary test for
financial stability regulation. 90 While regulators should certainly be mindful of the costs of
their regulations, the consequences of financial instability are potentially dire and

84. Nicholas Crudele, Dark Pool Regulation: Fostering Innovation and Competition while Protecting
Investors, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. & FIN. & COM. L 569, 569 (2015); see also Jordan M. Marciello, Are You Afraid of
the Dark: How the New York Attorney General is Shedding Light on Dark Pools and High Frequency Trading,
49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 163, 164 (2016) (discussing high frequency trading and dark pools).
85. Allen, Mandates and Structure, supranote 73, at 1114; see also Guttentag, supra note 69, at 210 for a
taxonomy of direct investor harms.
86. Allen, FSOC, supra note 2, at 1093.
87. Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency Criterion fbr Securities Regulation: Investor Welfare or Total
Surplus?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 87 (2015).
88. DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at 23; Allen, FSOC, supra note 2, at 1110.
89. For a discussion of some of the social costs of the Financial Crisis, see Allen, FSOC, supra note 2, at
1093-97.
90. For a thorough discussion of why quantified cost-benefit analysis is not appropriate for financial
stability regulation, see John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications, 124 YALE L. J. 882 (2015).
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irreversible, 9 1 and so the SEC should be afforded the flexibility to make informed value
judgments about the best path to facilitate long-term stability 92-notwithstanding that
doing so will create compliance costs, and therefore potentially reduce financial industry
profitability, in the short-term. 93 Unfortunately, there are difficult political economy issues
associated with financial stability regulation, because it is very difficult to show when such
regulation has succeeded (how can the SEC demonstrate that a crisis would have occurred
but for the SEC's regulatory efforts?). 94 Indeed, the more successful regulation is in
maintaining financial stability, the less need there seems to be for continuing such
regulation. As such, it is hard to rally public support for financial stability regulation,
95
except in the immediate aftermath of financial crises.
Fear of unintended consequences and lack of public support can sap regulators'
confidence in their ability to discharge their regulatory functions:96 the SEC has often
struggled with how precautionary it should be in promoting investor protection, and there
is much greater scope for unintended consequences when addressing something as complex
as financial stability. Furthermore, although there are several legislative bases that the SEC
could invoke in support of promoting financial stability,98 there is no unambiguous
legislative direction for it to do so. It would not be surprising, then, if the SEC were to
ignore financial stability concerns, or at least subsume them to investor protection and
capital formation concerns (fear of litigation from regulated entities may also incentivize
the SEC to avoid financial stability regulation and focus on its more concrete, and thus
easier to defend, statutory responsibilities). However, if the SEC fails to look out for the
stability of the markets it oversees, there is no other regulatory body that will do so, and
the financial system as a whole will be more vulnerable. As such, the IMF concluded in
2015 that "[t]he FSOC should be strengthened with member agencies [like the SEC] being
given an explicit financial stability mandate." 9 9 Even in the absence of such a legislative
change, the SEC should be encouraged to adopt reforms that are sensibly designed to
mitigate the risks of instability.

91. Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophyfbr FinancialStability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 173, 19091 (2013) [hereinafter Allen, A New Philosophy]. "[T]he social consequences of the recessions that follow deep
financial crises are lasting, notwithstanding that the broader economy will eventually cycle into a more prosperous
time." Id. at 193.
92. Id. at 206.
93. Id. at 193.
94. Id. at 190.
95. For a discussion of the political economy of financial stability regulation, see John C. Coffee Jr., The
PoliticalEconomy ofDodd-Frank:Why FinancialRefbrm Tends to Be Frustratedand Systemic Risk Perpetuated,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1031 (2012).
96. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the
Process of Policy Formation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 530 (1990) [hereinafter Langevoort, SEC as a
Bureaucracy].
97. Paredes, supra note 80, at 1006-10. Pasquale has also noted how cautious the SEC has been in taking
steps to address the investor protection concerns associated with HFT. Frank Pasquale, Law's Acceleration of
Finance:Redefining the Problem of High Frequency Trading, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2085, 2106 (2015).
98. See supra Part Ill.B.
99. The
United States:
Financial System
Stability Assessment,
IMF
7
(2015),
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/scr/2015/crl 5170.pdf.
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EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE REGULATION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Thus far, this Article's discussion of the SEC's regulatory goals has been rather
abstract. And by necessity, such a discussion must remain somewhat abstract, because we
cannot foresee the precise threats to investor protection, capital formation and financial
stability that might arise in the future. Nonetheless, to provide a more concrete illustration
of the role that the SEC can play in promoting financial stability, the second half of this
Article will look at the SEC's current equity market structure reform effort. In particular,
this Article will use high frequency trading-a practice that has been identified by the
FSOC as creating potential risks and vulnerabilities for the financial system 00-as a case
study that illustrates the type of contribution that the SEC can make as a financial stability
regulator. Part V will consider the potential impacts of HFT on the equity markets, and the
financial system more broadly, and Part VI will consider possible stability-oriented
responses from the SEC. Before delving into those issues, however, this Part IV will
provide context by explaining the SEC's historical approach to equity market structure
regulation: this is by no means a complete catalogue of the market structure regulation that
has been implemented during the SEC's existence, however. Rather, it is a narrative that
serves to highlight the SEC's initial reluctance towards, and then incrementally increasing
comfort with, taking action as a market structure regulator.
While Section 2 of the Securities Exchange Act made it clear that part of the
motivation for creating the SEC in 1934 was concern about "unnecessary, unwise and
destructive speculation" in the securities markets,101 the SEC has at times been critiqued
for its reluctance to regulate those markets.102 Werner, for example, argued that the first
thirty years of the SEC's existence were marked by "inaction and equivocation in
exercising power over broker-dealer practices, commission rates and exchange selfgovernment, and with disclaimers of SEC power to act as an economic regulator."l03 For
the early SEC, Werner argued, it was preferable to regulate the capital markets using the
statutorily-designated means of promoting disclosure and prohibiting fraud. Market
structure regulation, in contrast, would require the SEC to regulate practices that could
harm the markets, but were "equally capable of operating benignly"-and to do so with
104
little Congressional guidance as to which market practices were and were not desirable.
While poorly functioning securities markets could certainly harm investors, the harm
would be indirect, and the benefits of market regulation would therefore be largely invisible
to the members of the investing public receiving those benefits (except perhaps in moments
of crisis).1 0 5 Conversely, attempts to regulate existing market infrastructure would have
had a direct and disruptive impact on incumbent players, who would have had a vested

100. 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, FSOC 122 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studiesreports/Documents/FSOC%202016%2OAnnual%20Report.pdf.
101. Walter Werner, The SEC As A Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755, 757 (1984) (quoting President
Roosevelt).
102. Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators: A Survey, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239,1261
(2007).
103.

Werner, supra note 101, at 772.

104.
105.

Id. at 757-58.
Id. at 775, 779.
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interest in strongly resisting reform.106 Werner thus concluded that it was not surprising
that, in its early years, the SEC preferred to allocate its limited resources to dealing with
statutorily-mandated anti-fraud and disclosure measures, rather than to preparing for a
possible-but by no means guaranteed-breakdown of the securities markets. 107
Such a breakdown did occur, however, in the form of the back-office paperwork crisis
that spanned 1967-1970: during that period "over 100 NYSE firms failed, including
several large ones, as a result of their inability to document customer trades properly and
in a timely manner."lo8 This prompted the SEC to become somewhat more involved in
market structure regulation. 10 9 In addition, in 1975, the SEC received a legislative direction
from Congress (in the form of a new Section 11 A of the Securities Exchange Act) to
establish a new national market system that would allow for competition amongst trading
venues.
Nonetheless, the SEC made very slow progress in tackling market regulation.111
Writing in 1985, Macey and Haddock noted that the SEC had done little to implement
Congress's vision of a national market system. 112 They explained the SEC's failure to act
using a public choice framework, arguing that "[t]he SEC has chosen to disregard Congress
and instead support inefficient rules that grant favors to special interests, such as the
exchange specialists, and to the exchanges themselves."I 13 Macey and Haddock dismissed
the concerns that the SEC was raising at the time about the potential for market
fragmentation and internalization of order flow,114 as well as the difficulties it would face
in regulating a more fragmented market, 15 but it is possible that the SEC was genuinely
paralyzed by uncertainty about how to address these concerns.116

106. Id. at 764.
107. Id. at 764-65.
108. Jerry W. Markham, High Speed Trading on Stock and Commodity Markets-From CourierPigeons to
Computers, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555, 590 (2015); see also Werner, supra note 101, at 770. "A surge in trading
volume created more paper and paperwork than could be handled by an industry still operating largely as it had
in horse-and-buggy days. An apparently healthy industry became deathly sick over-night as over a hundred
broker-dealers, including many old and large firms, failed." Id. at 770.
109. Joel Seligman, CautiousEvolution or PerennialIrresolution:Stock Market Self-Regulation Duringthe
FirstSeventy Years of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59 BuS. LAW. 1347, 1367-68 (2004).
110. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, SEC Remarks Before the SEC Historical Society "The Continuous
Process of Optimizing the Equity Markets" (Jun. 2, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/the-continuousprocess-of-optimizing-the-equity-markets.html [hereinafter White, Remarks before the SEC Historical Society].
111. For an extensive discussion of the SEC's use of its powers under Section 1 IA between 1975 and 2005,
see Dale A. Oesterle, Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded its CongressionalMandate to Facilitate a
"NationalMarket System" in Securities Trading, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BuS. 613 (2005).
112. Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market
System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 322 (1985).
113. Id.at361.
114. Internalization refers to "withholding of retail orders from other market centers for the purpose of
executing them 'in-house' as principal, without exposing those orders to buying and selling interests in those
other market centers." Id. at 343.
115. Id. at 341, 343, 346.
116. Even when it comes to enforcement, a function that the SEC has traditionally had much more facility
with, the SEC has historically been timid in approaching cases where the outcome is uncertain, and there is a
significant drain on resources. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoif Scandal: Three Narratives in
Search of a Story, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 899, 906-07. The SEC may simply have lacked the resources or the
organizational mindset to engage in significant market structure reform at that time. See Seligman, supra note
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Finally, in 2005, the SEC made a significant intervention in market structure with the
adoption of Regulation NMS. NMS has been described by former SEC Chair Mary Jo
White as "a landmark body of rules that govem all aspects of today's national market
system.",l17 It was intended "to counter order flow fragmentation, promote equal regulation
of market centers and greater order interaction, and increase displayed depth of trading
interest,"
and the adopting release for Regulation NMS indicates that enhancing capital
formation was the SEC's primary motivator for adopting the Regulation. 119
Notwithstanding one's view of Regulation NMS (and the regulation has certainly been
criticized by many),120 its adoption signified the SEC's increased comfort with getting
involved in equities market structure regulation. However, the equity markets have
changed significantly even since 2005 (in part as a response to Regulation NMS),12 and
the SEC must again consider its role in regulating these altered markets-this time, in a
post-Financial Crisis era where there is increased focus on financial stability. The next Part
will consider in detail one of the forces reshaping the structure of these equity markets:
high frequency trading.
V. CASE STUDY: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING

High frequency trading or "HFT" has exploded in the last fifteen years, 122 abetted by
technological innovation and regulatory change, to the point where it is now thought to
account for more than half of the volume of all stocks trading in the United States. 123
Because high frequency traders now supply a significant portion of the liquidity available
to the equity markets, any disruption to the operations of such traders can disrupt the
orderly functioning of those markets, with potential flow-on effects for other linked
markets and the broader economy. Regulatory reform related to HFT therefore offers an

109, at 1384; Werner, supra note 101, at 772.
117.
118.
3 VA. L.
119.

White, Remarks Before the SEC Historical Society, supra note 110.
Stavros Gadinis, Market Structurefor Institutional Investors: Comparing the US and the EU Regimes,
& BUS. REV. 311, 331 (2008).
Relevantly, the SEC notes "[i]n its extended review of market structure issues and in assessing how

best to achieve an appropriate balance between competition among markets and competition among orders, the
Commission has been guided by a firm belief that one of the most important goals of the equity markets is to
minimize the transaction costs of long-term investors and thereby to reduce the cost of capital for listed

companies." Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,499 (June 29, 2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 200, 201,
230, 240, 242, 249, 270.
120. See DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supranote 76, at 69. These critics argue that broker/dealer's
duties of best execution, which would allow for competition on aspects of the trade in addition to price, would be
more successful than the Order Protection Rule in improving execution quality. Yadav has argued that because it
"helps order anticipation strategies to flourish," Regulation NMS has encouraged much of the high frequency
trading that has driven institutional investors to dark pools. Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines

Efficiency in CapitalMarkets, 68 VAND. L. REv. 1607, 1666 (2015) [hereinafter Yadav, Algorithmic Trading].
121. Some have argued that it was the promulgation of Regulation NMS that enabled HFT to proliferate.
See Pasquale,supra note 97, at 1027.
122. HFT has been in use since at least 2000. TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES IN MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY: FINAL REPORT 20 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter
"IOSCO HFT REPORT"].

123.

Gerig, supra note 4.
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excellent opportunity for the SEC to embrace the role of market-focused financial stability
regulator, and this Part will use it as a case study.
The practice of HFT is widely discussed but rarely defined with any precision: this
Article shall use the term HFT to denote "fully automated trading strategies with very high
trading volume and extremely short holding periods ranging from milliseconds to
minutes,"l24 but recognizes that this is an umbrella description that covers many variedand constantly evolving-trading strategies.125 One uniting feature of these strategies is
that "HFT firms profit mostly from small price changes and by small but frequent trades
executed. The strong focus on speed of execution and portfolio turnover are probably the
key characteristics that distinguish HFT from other types of algorithmic trading."l26 HFT
is a subset of algorithmic trading, meaning that trading is executed according to instructions
generated by a preset computer algorithm.127 Many types of HFT not only rely on
algorithms to execute trades, but also use them to identify and evaluate trading
opportunities.128 For example, algorithms may scour the internet for news of potentially
market-moving events, seek to detect cloaked large trades to trade ahead of, or deploy more
complicated formulae and data sets to identify mispriced stocks and execute arbitraging
trades.129 HFT firms tend to jealously guard the confidentiality of their trading
algorithms. 130
Like any new practice that has disrupted an existing market infrastructure, HFT has
both its proponents and detractors. Its proponents cite lowered costs, greater speed, and
increased liquidity as the benefits of high frequency tradingl31 (in particular, advocates
note that HFT has lowered bid-ask spreads),132 and the data do indeed suggest that
execution speed and cost for trades have decreased as the volume of HFT has increased. 133
Many also credit HFT with improving market efficiency by increasing the speed with
which information is impounded into securities' prices,134 and (through arbitrage
strategies) facilitating price discovery across fragmented markets. 135 Detractors often cite
concerns about fairness, the integrity of the markets, and the quality of the liquidity
provided by HFT (from a financial stability perspective, liquidity is only really valuable if
it is reliably available). 136
124. X. Frank Zhang, High-Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility, and Price Discovery 1 (Dec. 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=1691679.
125. IOSCO HFT REPORT, supra note 122, at 24.
126. Id. at 23.
127. Id. at 11.
128. Id. at 22-23.
129.

Brummer, supra note 33, at 1002; Merritt B. Fox et al., The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense,

65 DUKE L.J. 191, 202-203 (2015).
130. Zachary Warmbrodt, The Mystery of High-Frequency Trading, POLITICO (Sept. 28, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/09/algorithmic-high-frequency-stock-market-trading-000208.
131.

DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at 16.

132. When Improving Markets, First Do No Harm, MOD. MKTS. INITIATIVE (July 10, 2014),
http://modernmarketsinitiative.org/07/2014/improving-markets-do-no-harm.
133.

IOSCO HFT REPORT, supra note 122, at 10; DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at

166.
134.

MOD. MKTS. INITIATIVE, supra note 132.

135.
136.

Id.
See infra Parts V.A-C.

The SEC as FinancialStability Regulator

2018]

737

This Article does not take a position on whether the rise of HFT is, on balance, a good
or bad development for our equity markets. Ultimately, many of the touted benefits and
costs of HFT are empirical claims, and to date, many of the studies that have sought to
verify these claims and quantify the impact of the advent of HFT have generated
inconsistent results. 137 In time, a consensus position may emerge from these studies, but
138
the SEC should exercise caution when reviewing studies that rely on historical data:
much of the research generated on HFT is likely to focus on normal times, and downplay
(or even ignore entirely) low probability events that may dramatically impact the equities
markets if and when they do occur. 139 For example, a number of significant glitches have
roiled the equities markets in recent years. The most infamous of these was the so-called
"Flash Crash" of May 6, 2010.
According to a joint report by the SEC and CFTC, the Flash Crash was triggered by
a mutual fund firm using a trading algorithm to release $4.1 billion of stock futures into
the markets within the space of 20 minutes.140 As soon as some of the stock futures were
purchased, the mutual fund's algorithm would direct it to sell more, but the algorithm failed
to note that many of the purchasers of these stock futures were high-frequency traders, who
turned around and sold the futures almost immediately. As such, the mutual fund's
algorithm was selling when its previous sales had not yet been properly absorbed into the
market 41-the resulting volatility ensured that many longer-term buyers held off from
purchasing the stock futuresl42 and as a result, the stock futures were simply bouncing
around amongst the high-frequency traders. 143 Without real buyers, prices of the futures
fell by more than five percent in under five minutes, until the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
briefly halted trading in the futures.144 Problems with trading these stock futures then

137. STAFF OF THE DIV. OF TRADING AND MARKETS, SEC, EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE
18,
2014),
FREQUENCY
TRADING
10-11
(Mar.
REVIEW;
PART
11;
HIGH
https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft_1it-review-march_2014.pdf. IOSCO HFT REPORT, supra note
122, at 25-26. Part of the problem is that "high frequency trading" describes so many varied trading practices,

and another part of the problem is that HFT has come to prominence during a period when financial markets have
been roiled by crises, and affected by regulatory reforms implemented in reaction to such crises. As such, it is

difficult to isolate the variables that pertain solely to the increasing adoption of HFT strategies.
138.

The SEC has committed itself to using a data-driven approach to evaluate these claims as it formulates

new rules for market structure reform. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at the Sandler O'Neill & Partners,
L.P. Global Exchange and Brokerage Conference: Enhancing Our Equity Market Structure (June 5, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542004312 [hereinafter White, Enhancing Our Equity
Market].
139.

One rare exception is Pankaj Jain et al., Does High-Frequency TradingIncrease Systemic Risk?, 31 J.

FIN. MKTS. 1 (2016). "By focusing on the tails, we are able to highlight that whereas prior findings about [HFT]'s
contribution to market quality discussed at the beginning of this introduction are applicable in most normal
periods, special attention is required to deal with the adverse impact of [HFT] during tail events." Id. at 3.
140. CFTC & SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, at 2 (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf (hereinafter FLASH CRASH REPORT).

141.

Id. at 3.

142. "This sudden decline in both price and liquidity may be symptomatic of the notion that prices were
moving so fast, fundamental buyers and cross-market arbitrageurs were either unable or unwilling to supply

enough buy-side liquidity." Id. at 4.
143. Id. at 3.
144. Id. at 4.
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infected the trading of the underlying equity securities, 145 and the combined effect of this
activity was to cause major equity indices like the Dow Jones Industrial Average to
plummet five to six percent in a matter of minutes.146 The SEC/CFTC report on the Flash
Crash concluded that "under stressed market conditions, the automated execution of a large
sell order can trigger extreme price movements, especially if the automated execution
algorithm does not take prices into account. Moreover, the interaction between automated
execution programs and algorithmic trading strategies can quickly erode liquidity and
result in disorderly markets." 147
Although the Flash Crash remains the most significant market glitch in recent years,
it was not the last. The HFT firm Knight Capital suffered $460 million in losses in 2012 as
the result of a computer glitch, and ultimately had to be acquired by a competitor.148 There
was also a so-called "treasury flash crash" in October of 2014 that affected the price of
U.S. Treasury bonds, 149 and a number of so-called "mini flash crashes," where
"[i]ndividual stocks [including Walmart and Google] at times gyrate[d] wildly within
fractions of a second, only to reset moments later." 1 50 Some staff at the SEC have
concluded that these mini crashes are caused by human "fat-finger" errors, rather than "by
proprietary, hi h-speed algorithms, by robots gone wild, or by excessive order
cancelations," 1 but this is not necessarily comforting-even if HFT algorithms are not

145.
146.

FLASH CRASH REPORT, supra note 140, at 4-6.
Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, "PureInformation," and the SEC Disclosure

Paradigm,90 TEX. L. REv. 1601, 1703 (2012).
147.

FLASH CRASH REPORT, supra note 140, at 6. The Flash Crash Report did not suggest that any market

manipulation had precipitated the event, but since that report was released, the extradition of British national
Navinder Singh Sarao has been ordered to the United States, in order for him to stand trial for "spoofing" that
allegedly contributed (albeit in a relatively minor way) to the occurrence of the Flash Crash.
Prosecutors in the United States have accused Mr. Sarao of entering and withdrawing thousands of
orders worth tens of millions of dollars each on hundreds of trading days, in an attempt to push down
the price of futures contracts tied to the value of the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index, a practice
known as spoofing. Chad Bray, Judge OrdersExtradition to U.S. in 'Flash Crash'Case,N.Y. TIMES

(Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/business/dealbook/judge-orders-extraditionto-us-in-flash-crash-case.html. Id.
148.

Knight Capital's woes were occasioned by a computer glitch on August 1, 2012 that "led the firm's

computers to rapidly buy and sell millions of shares in over a hundred stocks for about 45 minutes after the
markets opened. Those trades pushed the value of many stocks up, and the company's losses appear to have
occurred when it had to sell the overvalued shares back into the market at a lower price." Nathaniel Popper, Knight

Capital Says Trading Glitch Cost it $440 Million, N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
2, 2012),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/02/knight-capital-says-trading-mishap-cost-it-440-million.
Knight
Capital suffered $460 million in losses, threatening the stability of the firm, and by December of 2012, Knight
Capital had agreed to let itself be sold to Getco, leading to further consolidation of the HFT industry. Nathaniel
Popper,
High-Speed
Trading
Giants
to
Merge,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
20,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/business/knight-capital-announces-sale-to-getco.html.
149. Matt Levine, Algorithms Had Themselves a Treasury Flash Crash, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2015, 5:26
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-07-13/algorithms-had-themselves-a-treasury-flash-crash.
150. Kara M. Stein, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks before Trader Forum 2014 Equity Trading Summit (Feb. 6,
2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540761194.
151. Gregg E. Berman, Assoc. Dir., Off. Analytics and Research, SEC Div. of Trading and Mkts.,
Transformational Technologies, Market Structure, and the SEC, Speech at the SIFMA TECH Conference (Jun.
18, 2013),
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the ultimate cause of market disruption, they can nonetheless act as a transmission belt, 152
and while none of these crashes or mini crashes has had a broad systemic impact to date,
there is a concern that similar incidents could precipitate a crisis in the future. This Part
will explore in more detail the problems that the practice of HFT poses for financial
stability, but it will first consider how the rise of HFT impacts the more conventional SEC
missions of promoting investor protection and capital formation.
A. High Frequency Trading and Investor Protection
Despite the ubiquity of the term, there has been little academic discussion about what
investor protection actually means. To help fill this void, Guttentag has identified four
different types of problems that the SEC seeks to address in order to protect investors: "(1)
fraud; (2) an unlevel informational playing field; (3) the extraction of private benefits from
the firm by firm insiders [sometimes referred to as 'tunneling']; and (4) investors'
propensity to make unwise investment decisions."l53 Michael Lewis' popular book "Flash
Boys" brought to wide public attention the advantages that high frequency traders have
over other investors in terms of access to information and speed of execution, 154 focusing
on the "unlevel informational playing field" of investor protection (although there are also
concerns that HFT will create new opportunities for market-manipulation and fraud).' 55
As one author commented, firms with "access to information about the flow or orders and
price changes just a few seconds before others" are able to trade upon that information
when others are not, conferring an informational advantage on those firms.156 ,A few
seconds" may be overstating the time periods involved: HFT firms now seek to have
millisecond or even microsecond advantages over their competitors by physically locating
their computers close to the trading infrastructure (known as co-location)1 57 so that they

https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365 171575716
Technologies].
152. IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 25, at 22.
153.
154.
155.

[hereinafter

Berman,

Transformational

Guttentag, supra note 69, at 210.
MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH Boys: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014).
DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at 170.

Algorithmic traders may also engage in tactics that resemble traditional market manipulation. For
example, 'momentum ignition' entails the placement of a series of orders or execution of a series of
trades in order to 'ignite' a rapid but artificial price movement. 'Spoofing' or 'layering' strategies

may display and immediately cancel limit orders in order to trigger another trader's algorithms into
trading more aggressively. Other strategies, such as 'quote stuffing' may simply seek to sow
confusion by flooding a market center with a barrage of market data messages and taking advantage
of traders caught in the chaos. Id.
156. Peter J. Henning, Market ChangesMay Prompt a New Definition ofInsider Trading,N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/dealbook/market-changes-may-prompt-new-definition-

of-insider-trading.html.
157. "Co-location services exist to house trading systems used by market participants (and potentially other
parties, such as data vendors) in a location close to trading venue servers. Such services are generally provided
by a trading venue, whether within its data centre or in a location of close physical proximity. By providing colocated firms with the shortest available physical distance to the trading venue's systems, co-location offers the

advantage of extremely low latency, an essential ingredient in certain trading strategies typically used by high
frequency traders and other firms wanting high speed access to the markets." IOSCO HFT REPORT, supra note
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are the first to receive information from, and submit their orders to, such infrastructure.

158

Without expensive real estate and extensive computin 5ower, other traders (even large
Although these advantages may
institutional investors) are at a permanent disadvantage.
only allow high frequency traders to recoup fractions of a cent per trade, these fractions of
a cent can add up to a significant amount of profit when a high volume of trades are
consummated. 160
Lewis is not the only one to have critiqued the informational advantages obtained by
high frequency traders through their superior computer equipment and geographical
location. 61 Some commentators are less concerned, though, pointing out that some degree
of informational disparity has always existed between different types of investors (even in
the days when information was communicated by carrier pigeon or telegraph).162 It is also
true that the majority of the trading counterparties complaining of the unlevel informational
playing field are sophisticated institutional investors, rather than the more vulnerable retail
investors that the SEC typically champions.163 To the extent that retail investors are harmed
by such informational asymmetries, it would typically be indirect, as a result of their
investing through institutional investor intermediaries. 164 However, even the mere
perception that HFT has made the equities markets less fair than in the past can be
damaging to the confidence of both retail and institutional investors -65a
point which is
also relevant to the following Parts' discussion of capital formation and financial stability.
Potential harms to investors posed by HFT may also be subtler than concerns about
"rigged markets". Yadav has examined in detail how the rise in HFT undermines the
economic theories on which much of the securities laws' investor protection regime, as
well as its promotion of capital formation, as discussed in the next Part, is predicated.
Relevantly, the "anti-tunneling" aspect of investor protection identified by Guttentag
assumes that investors are protected from bad decisions, rent seeking and lazy behavior by
securities issuers because of the market discipline exerted by a change in a security's price;
a low price invites shareholder activism or takeover attempts which may result in the
issuer's managers losing their jobs, or reducing the value of their stock-linked
compensation.166 To the extent that a drop in share price acts as a form of market discipline
on the issuer of that share, the dissemination of information that precipitates that drop
works as a form of investor protection, and if information ceases to be efficiently

122, at 17.
158. DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at 16.
159. HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS,
REGULATION 905 (2012).

160.

IOSCO HFT REPORT, supra note 122, at 23.

161.

DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at 16.

POLICY, AND

162. Markham, supra note 108, at 567-81.
163. For a discussion of retail and institutional investors, see Langevoort, Retail Investors, supra note 38, at
1025. Langevoort notes that "throughout the SEC's history and culture, the rhetorical stress has been on the plight
of average investors, ones who lack investing experience and sophistication so as to need the protection of the
securities laws." Id.
164. Id. at 1030.
165. Tamar Frankel, Regulation and Investors' Trust in the Securities Markets, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 439, 444
(2002).
166. Yadav, Algorithmic Trading, supra note 120, at 1616.
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impounded into the price of equity securities, then investor protection suffers. 167 There is
at least anecdotal evidence that some institutional investors have been discouraged from
participating in the equities markets because they feel outmatched by high frequency
tradersI 6 8-informed traders who would otherwise bring their judgment of the issuer's
fundamentals to bear, and thus protect investors from "tunneling" by the issuer's
management.16 9
B. High Frequency Trading and CapitalFormation
The crowding out of informed traders, and resulting erosion of the reliability of price
signals, also poses a problem for capital formation.170 "When investors can easily
understand what securities are worth, they can invest their capital in those enterprises that
are likely to use it most productively and profitably,',171 but if prices become less likely to
reflect the trading decisions of investors with information about the fundamental value of
the issuer, capital is less likely to be allocated on the basis of fundamental expectations of
long-term growth.172 After all, when the intention is only to hold a share for a fraction of
a second, there is little incentive for high frequency traders to invest in determining the
likely long-term trajectory of the issuer of that share.173 Instead, in markets where HFT
dominates, prices are more likely to be a reflection of algorithms' responses to short-term
market movements. As Haldane notes, "[w]ith a large fraction of momentum traders, prices
deviate persistently from fundamentals. Among untested investors, momentum strategies
now flourish while long-term fundamentalists fail. The speculative balance of investors
1 74
rises, increasing the degree of misalignment in prices."
Capital formation also requires liquidity-without a robust market for buying and
selling equity securities, it will be harder for capital to flow to end users. HFT certainly
seems to increase some measures of liquidity, in terms of lowering transaction costs and
increasing the volume of equities posted for trading. 175 However, there are arguments
about the quality of the liquidity provided by high frequency traders. Many of the orders
submitted by such traders are submitted to elicit information about market movements or

167.

Id. at 1638. See also DOMBALAGlAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at 24 (noting that where

information is not easily accessible, trading is less likely to direct capital to its best uses).
168. IOSCO HFT REPORT, supra note 122, at I1. For a thorough explanation of this phenomenon, see Fox
et al., supra note 129, at 231, 234.
169. "Losing out over time to high-speed algorithmic traders, fundamental traders can see fewer incentives
to invest deeply in long-term research and investment. Importantly, lower gains from research can also diminish
the motivation of fundamental traders to engage in governance of capital markets, for example, in shareholder
monitoring." Yadav, Algorithmic Trading, supra note 120, at 1644. See also IOSCO HFT REPORT, supra note
122, at 13.
170. Yadav, Algorithmic Trading, supra note 120, at 1656, 1659-63.
171. Id. at 1631-32.
172. Fox et al., supra note 129, at 234; Pasquale, supra note 97, at 2087.
173. As Dombalagian notes, "high-frequency traders do not necessarily hold sufficient capital to maintain
positions in a financial instrument for an extended period of time; as a result their trading interest is often
ephemeral." DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at 168.
174. Andrew Haldane, Exec. Dir., Bank of Eng., Patience and Finance: Speech at the Oxford China Business
Forum (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.bis.org/review/rl00909e.pdf.
175. IOSCO HFT REPORT, supra note 122, at 26.
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to influence market prices, without any intention of consummating said orders. 176
Significant numbers of orders are cancelled before any trade can be executed, 177 and
cancelled orders provide no real liquidity to other market participants. There are also some
who argue that even the provision of genuine liquidity by high frequency traders can be
problematic, given that such liquidity encourages more high frequency traders to enter the
market; it is much easier to deploy HFT strategies in a market that is awash in liquidity.178
It is therefore possible that increased liquidity will increase the risk that longer-term
informed traders will be crowded out of the equities markets by swarms of high frequency
traders. As such, even when the equities markets are functioning normally, there are some
problems associated with the liquidity that HFT provides. As the next Part will explore,
from a financial stability perspective, the greater concern with HFT is that there is no
guarantee that high frequency traders will continue to provide liquidity to the equities
markets in times of market stress. 179
C. High Frequency Trading and FinancialStability
A number of high-profile episodes-most infamously, the Flash Crash of 2010-have
drawn attention to the threats that HFT may pose for financial stability.180 While none of
the market disruptions to date has had a broad systemic impact, many are concerned that
similar incidents could precipitate a full-blown crisis in the future.1 8 1 Notably, in April

176. Peter J. Henning, Market Changes May Prompt a New Definition olInsider Trading, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2015).
177. IOSCO HFT REPORT, supra note 122, at 22.
178. Haldane, supra note 174.
179. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Strengthening Our Equity Market Structure, Speech at the Economic
Club of New York (Sept. 7, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch0907IOmls.htm) [hereinafter
Schapiro, Strengthening Our Equityl.
In the old manual market structure, the market participants with the best access to the markets-the
specialists on the dominant exchanges-were subject to significant trading obligations that were
designed to promote fair and orderly markets and fair treatment of investors. These included

affirmative obligations to provide liquidity and to promote price continuity, as well as negative
obligations to forego trading in ways that would exacerbate price moves -

such as aggressively

taking out bids during a price decline and thereby driving prices even lower. Id.
See also DOMBALAGIAN, CH4ASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at 166.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 140-150. For a more general discussion of SEC regulation being

spurred by crises, see Paredes, supra note 80, at 977.
181. Bruno Biais & Paul Woolley, The FlipSide: High Frequency Trading, FIN. WORLD, Feb. 2012, at 34,
35.
[A]lgorithmic trades tend to be correlated, suggesting that the HFT strategies used in the market are
not as diverse as those used by human traders. In this context, shocks hitting the small number of
very active algorithmic traders might affect the entire market. And, because high frequency trading

firms are often very lightly capitalized, this could generate failures. Handling the corresponding
counterparty risk could be daunting, given that HFT firms turn over their positions many times a day,
while clearing systems operate at a much lower frequency. Combined, these elements could generate
systemic market disruptions. Id.

See also Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 706 (2013) (noting how experts fear it's "only
a matter of time before" a big crisis).
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2015, a group of senior financial regulators from the United States, Canada, Japan, and
Europe issued a report that very clearly voiced concerns about the impact of HFT on
financial stability: they noted that "[t]he complexity of market interactions among HFT
firms and other market participants increases the potential for systemic risk to propagate
across venues and asset classes over very short periods of time." 1 82 They also noted that
"[a]n error at a relatively small algorithmic trading firm may cascade through the market,
resulting in a sizable impact on the financial markets through direct errors or the reactions
of other algorithms to the error." 1 83 In other words, HFT has the potential to both generate
and transmit shocks through the financial system.
HFT algorithms are often based on similar assumptions, and thus often react to market
events in a herd-like fashion. 184 In addition, many algorithms are designed to react to other
algorithms in order to "anticipate how their own trading impacts the trading of other players
and to adapt their trading to reflect consequential price changes," amplifying the impact of
any market event. 185 These algorithms thus build rigid feedback loops and tight coupling
into the financial system, with the result that a shock can be transmitted quickly through
the equities markets and disrupt pricing and liquidity in other parts of the financial system
in short order. 186
When HFT algorithms are programmed to trade equity securities, those trades will
necessarily impact the price of those securities, and other market participants will react to
that price with further trades.187 As such, if a glitch in an HFT firm's algorithm caused it
to keep selling a particular equity security on a continuous basis and other algorithms
followed suit, then the price of that equity security could fall dramatically. Of course, the
price could certainly rebound quickly to a more reasonable range-as happened during the
Flash Crash' 8-but it is also possible that the price could remain low for a more prolonged
period oftime,189 with the result that highly-leveraged financial institutions with exposure
to the depressed equity securities would need to sell assets quickly.190 Such an outcome
(Apr.
2015),
GROUP
1
182. Algorithmic Trading Briefing Note, SENIOR SUPERVISORS
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/news/banking/2015/SSG-algorithmic-trading-

2015.pdf.
183. Id. at 2.
184. Yadav, Algorithmic Trading,supra note 120, at 1622.
185. Id. at 1620.
186. IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 25, at 25.
A process is said to be "tightly coupled" if it moves from one stage to another with little opportunity
for intervention . . Tight coupling can occur when automated processes are used in trading. Trading
algorithms can create feedback loops when they respond to changes in the price of a security that
were initiated by the algorithm or another trader. Id.

187.

For a thorough discussion of the market participants involved in high frequency trading and its impact

on stock prices, see Fox et al., supra note 129.

188.

The market turmoil started at approximately 2:40 p.m., and "[b]y approximately 3:00 p.m., most

securities had reverted back to trading at prices reflecting tine consensus values." FLASH CRASH REPORT, supra
note 140, at 6.

189. To the author's knowledge, there is no definitive empirical work on how frequently financial institutions
adjust their asset portfolios in response to prompts from their internal risk models, but it is likely to be multiple
times a day-meaning that a pricing anomaly that endured for a few hours would have the potential to trigger a
systemic impact.
190. "As different managers experience similar effects, they are likely to react in the same way by each
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would be exacerbated by the Value-at-Risk (VAR) models that many financial institutions
rely on to assess the risks associated with their investment portfolios 91-and which
constantly prompt those institutions to offload assets as prices decline. 192 The assets to be
sold would not necessarily be equities-highly-leveraged institutions might prefer to
reduce their leverage by selling other types of assets. If multiple institutions react in a
similar way, the result will be depressed prices in a number of different asset classes. These
further depressed prices might force other institutions to deleverage, creating a vicious

cycle.

193

Problems with individual stock prices could also be transmitted to different asset
classes in other ways. For example, some HFT algorithms are programmed to trade in
response to perceived discrepancies between the prices of linked asset classes (for instance,
between the prices of stock in a corporation and a futures contract referencing that stock).
If enough HFT firms are using similar arbitrage strategies, then problems relating to one
asset class will affect trading of the linked asset class. 194 In addition, many financial
instruments-like ETFs-rely on stock indices as a basis for their pricing; 195 problems in
the equities markets can impact the ability of indices to be calculated properly, and thus
impact the liquidity of the products that rely on such indices for their pricing.196 Stocks
also serve as reference obligations for options and other derivative contracts; a problem
with equities pricing will impact the value of those contracts for the counterparties
thereto. 1 97 At the extreme, if asset pricing across the financial system is severely
compromised, then that can lead to the insolvency of financial institutions, which will
impact the availability of credit and payments processing for participants in the broader
economy.198
Ultimately, the potential impact of an HFT algorithm on the broader financial system

selling assets, causing greater price volatility and prompting further sales. The result is a cascading decline in
value, with greater coordination impairing each firm's ability to manage its own risk exposure." Charles K.

Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 323, 326-27 (2011).
191. VaR models generate a dollar figure that represents how much a financial institution stands to lose on
its investments on any given day, within a predefined confidence level. Notwithstanding the limitations of the

predictive capacity of VaR models, they are widely used. See Peter Conti-Brown, A Proposed Fat-Tail Risk
Metric: Disclosures, Derivatives and the Measurement of FinancialRisk, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1461-62
(2009).
192. Adrian and Shin have found that "for financial intermediaries, their models of risk and economic capital
dictate active management of their overall Value-at-Risk (VaR) through adjustments of their balance sheets."

Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity and Leverage, 19 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 418 (2010).
193. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Decipheringthe Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008,23 J. ECON. PERSP.
77, 94 (2009).
194. This is what happened during the Flash Crash: problems with futures trading ultimately impacted
trading in equities. See supra notes 140-147 and accompanying text (explaining declines in price and liquidity
and analyzing the cause).

195.

"[S]ince ETFs are comprised of a basket of individual stocks, large moves in one or two stocks can

trigger pauses in automated ETF trading systems as the integrity of those prices are checked." Oversight of the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: EvaluatingPresentReforms and Future Challenges: Hearingbefore
the S. Comm. on CapitalMkts., Insurance, and Gov't SponsoredEnters., 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Mary

L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC).
196.

DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at 6.

197.
198.

Id. at 170-71.
Hilary J. Allen, The PathologiesofBanking Business as Usual, 17 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 861, 873-74 (2015).

2018]

The SEC as FinancialStability Regulator

745

will vary depending on the type of trading strategy being deployed, but the most obvious
problem with most forms of HFT is speed-automated trades can happen too quickly for
market participants to pull back or for regulators to intervene, even when the stock prices
quoted are clearly erroneous. 199 While humans are certainly involved in programming HFT
algorithms, once the algorithm has been set, the trading is self-executing-there is no time
to apply human judgment to individual decisions about whether to trade or not.200 Although
one new exchange has built some delay into the trading process (to help address investor
protection concerns arising from the unlevel informational playing field), its delay of 350
microseconds is insufficient to allow the exercise of human judgment-and therefore,
would not address financial stability concerns.201
Before trading was so fully automated, human judgment acted as something of a
circuit-breaker,202 halting trading when prices were clearly awry-as one journalist put it
"None of that [i.e. the Flash Crash] would have happened back in 1987. Then there were
people involved."203 Now, the market is comprised of potentially fraught interactions
between humans and algorithms.204 Reports of news events that are clearly erroneousmaybe even items in satirical internet publications 205-can impact trading because
algorithms have neither the time nor the ability to exercise judgment as to whether news is
legitimate.206 Human traders who do have the ability to filter such information will
nonetheless react to price movements effected by algorithmic trades, responding to such
information. As happened during the Flash Crash, human traders may withdraw from the
199. "[F]inancial technology ... must also contend with Murphy's Law, 'whatever can go wrong will go
wrong,' as well as its technology-specific corollary, 'whatever can go wrong will go wrong faster and bigger
when computers are involved."' Andrei A. Kirilenko & Andrew W. Lo, Moore 's Law versus Murphy's Law:
Algorithmic Tradingand Its Discontents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 52 (2013).
200. "Computers often exclusively execute these complex formulas without any human interference after
the initial installation." Lin, supra note 181, at 689.
201. For a discussion of the IEX exchange and its mandated latency, see Yesha Yadav, Insider Tradingand
Market Structure, 63 UCLA L. REV. 968, 1029 (2016).
202. Fox et al., supra note 129, at 248. As to the necessity for human judgment in trading, see Dombalagian,
PreservingHuman Agency, supranote 66, at 78.
203. Floyd Norris, In Markets' Tuned-Up Machinery, Stubborn GhostsRemain, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013,
PM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/in-markets-tuned-up-machinery-stubbom-ghosts8:38
remain/?rref-collection%2Fbyline%2Ffloydnorris&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream unit&version=atest&con
tentPlacement-159&pgtype=collection.
204. Data is not yet available as to "basic empirical facts such as the relative proportions of trading for which
human beings and algorithms are responsible." Donald MacKenzie, A Sociology ofAlgorithms: High-Frequency
Trading and the Shaping of Markets, U. EDINBURGH SCH. SOC. & POL. SC. 2 (June 2014),
http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/_data/assets/pdf file/0004/156298/Algorithms25.pdf.
205. For example, on April 1, 2015, a "[tlesla press release jokingly announced a new 'W' model for a
watch. It was clearly intended as a joke. However, it was taken all too seriously by computers dutifully executing
their algorithms in response to the press release. The algorithms didn't quite get the joke, trading hundreds of
thousands of shares and spiking the stock price within one minute of the issuance of the release." Kara M. Stein,
Comm'r, SEC, The Dominance of Data and the Need for New Tools: Remarks at the SIFMA Operations
Conference (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2015-spch04l4l5kms.html [hereinafter Stein,
Dominance of Data].
206. Alina Selyukh, Hackers sendfake market-moving AP tweet on White House explosions, REUTERS (Apr.
23, 2013, 12:31 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-usa-whitehouse-ap/hackers-send-fake-marketmoving-ap-tweet-on-white-house-explosions-idUSBRE93M12Y20130423.
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markets if unusual market movements cause them to fear "the occurrence of a cataclysmic
event of which they were not yet aware." 207
The Bundesbank has found that once certain levels of market volatility are reached,
HFT algorithms are also likely to withdraw from the markets:208 many such algorithms
lack instructions for how to address low-probability tail events other than to simply cease
trading.209 Although such an approach will help preserve the solvency of individual HFT
firms in times of exigency, if many high frequency traders simultaneously deploy a "kill
switch" to withdraw from the markets in times of turmoil, then that will cause liquidity to
evaporate.210 Given that high frequency traders are a crucial source of market liquidity, if
they exit the markets en masse, other investors will have limited opportunities to trade and
may be forced to exit positions at a deep discount.211 There is therefore potential for a
vicious cycle: the pricing issues that caused the turmoil are rendered even more acute by a
reduction in liquidity, ensuring even more misaligned prices and a further reduction in

liquidity.
The developers of trading algorithms are unlikely to address these issues of their own
volition-algorithms work faster and more efficiently if there are fewer lines of code, and
so attempting to cater for rare eventualities by including more lines of code slows down
the algorithm and leaves the trader at a competitive disadvantage.212 There is little
incentive for a high frequency trader to utilize slower but safer code if many of the
consequences of algorithmic failure are likely to be externalized to the markets or the
economy at large. Even if such incentives could somehow be addressed (or the code
developer were unusually altruistic), no HFT firm would have the knowledge or ability to
design an algorithm that entirely avoided systemic consequences because it would not be
able to anticipate how its algorithms might interact with those of its competitors (such
algorithms are kept highly confidential).213 Furthermore, even a hypothetically perfect
207.

FLASH CRASH REPORT, supra note 140, at 5.

208. "[I]n periods of heightened volatility . .. passive HFT market players, ie those that provide liquidity,
typically keep a low profile by deleting trading orders, thereby reducing the supply of liquidity." High-Frequency
Trading Can Amplify Financial Market Volatility, DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK
(Oct. 25, 2016),
https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Topics/2016/2016_10_25_monthly-report-october high-frequency

.trading.html.
209. "Pre-set programming constraints also mean that algorithms cannot reflect information that falls outside
of the scope of their programming. This might sound obvious, but it is significant for the quality of prices that
markets produce. Precisely because of their constraints, algorithms can struggle to deal with exceptional situations

that fall outside of their programming-unexpected news, crashes, or anomalous trading behavior that do not fit
precisely set, ex ante parameters . . . algorithms to deal with exceptional events that occur infrequently." Yadav,

Algorithmic Trading, supra note 120, at 1614.
210.

DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at 169.

211. "The rapid evaporation of liquidity can affect the ability of a firm to meet its financial obligations and
can be a channel through which the negative effects of a trigger event can spread across securities markets and
throughout the financial system." IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 25, at 23-24. See also Brummer,

supra note 33, at 1033; Yadav, Algorithmic Trading, supra note 120, at 1629.
212. In light of the high costs involved in developing nuanced algorithms, "it is rational for traders to build
systems that deal with the worst-case scenarios, with blunt, one-size-fits-all tools that shut down activity and

ensure the trader can exit the market as quickly as possible. Traders limit the private costs to themselves, though
risks can shift to the market as a whole." Yadav, Algorithmic Trading, supra note 120, at 1655.
213. Researchers who interviewed HFT firms found that such firms found that "modeling stress test
scenarios to replicate events like [the Flash Crash] is a challenge." Carol Clark & Rajeev Ranjan, How do
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algorithm could experience operational problems involving hardware or softwareglitches might also be precipitated by human error, including so-called "fat-finger errors,"
such as mistyped security symbols or incorrectly specified limit prices."214 Or it is possible
that the sheer volume of algorithmic trades could simply overwhelm the systems of the
trading venues designed to process them.215 Any of these glitches could act as a shock that
could percolate through the financial system, ultimately undermining the availability of
liquidity.
Some commentators accept the possibility of the evaporation of liquidity in times of
extreme volatility as an appropriate price to pay for increased efficiency when the system
is running smoothly. For example, Fox et al. have argued that "[e]vents such as the Flash
Crash seem bound to occur from time to time with an HFT-dominated system for providing
liquidity.... These occasional brief moments of total collapse of liquidity do not really
seem very important in terms of our touchstones for efficiency."16 However, if we
evaluate HFT from a financial stability rather than an efficiency perspective, events such
as the Flash Crash are more troubling. While it is true that liquidity was quickly restored
after the Flash Crash (and other smaller glitches that have occurred to date), there is no
assurance that this will always be the case. Emergency measures deployed by regulators to
calm the markets following such an event may in fact exacerbate the panic or may be
insufficient to staunch the lack of confidence in the pricing of equity stocks.
For example, circuit breakers, which are in place in some markets, enable regulators
to temporarily halt trading to allow time for more reasoned evaluation of market
movements,217 with the hope that trading will be more rational and orderly when it
resumes.218 However, circuit breakers are by no means perfect-they are unable to contain
after-hours trading, and they may not be able to suspend trading in other jurisdictions or in
linked markets.
As one expert noted, they "often cause more problems than they

ProprietaryTradingFirms Control the Risks of High Speed Trading?, FED. RES. BANK OF CHI. 10 (Mar. 2012),
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/policy-discussion-papers/2012/pdp-1; Indeed, some HFT firms may not
even have the systems in place to calculate their own enterprise wide portfolio risk. Id. at 5.
214. Gregg E. Berman, Assoc. Dir., Off. Analytics and Research, SEC Div. of Trading and Mkts., Address
at the 12' Annual SIFMA Market Structure Conference: Market Structure: What We Know, and What We Need

to Know (Sept. 21, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/201 1/spch0921 I 1geb.pdf [hereinafter Berman, Market Structure: What We
Know]. "Human beings-in all their irrationality, impulsiveness, greed and fear-were unpredictable and thus
did not interact well with computers, even though people programmed them. Unlike computers, human beings
made plenty of mistakes inputting and executing orders, "upsetting the rigid computer-driven systems, which
depend on precise order." Brummer, supranote 33, at 1004, 1033.

215. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594 (Jan. 21, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 242).
216. Fox et al., supra note 129, at 248.
217. Currently, in the United States, "a 15-minute pause kicks in when the price of the S&P 500 index
declines by 7% or more before 3:25 p.m. Another is triggered if it declines by 13% or more. If it crosses 20%, all
trading is halted. If there is a 7% or 13% decline at or after 3:25 p.m., trading continues unless it reaches 20%."
Bradley Hope

& Dan Strumpf,

The Problem with Circuit Breakers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2016),

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-problem-with-circuit-breakers-1452205576.
218. IOSCO HFT REPORT, supra note 122, at 46.
219. Market fragmentation is being exacerbated by the proliferation of alternative trading venues like dark
pools. DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supranote 76, at 173.
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solve."220 Inability to trade on the suspended market may create a frenzy of trading
elsewhere, and this other trading will likely affect prices of equities and linked financial
products once trading resumes (if trading is panicked and disorderly upon resumption, that
may even retrigger the circuit breaker).221 There are also investor protection concerns
associated with deploying circuit breakers. For example, if a circuit breaker is triggered,
then investors may be trapped in positions they wish to offload.222 Finally, traders with the
quickest access to information will be the first to know when the halt in trading is ended,
effectively allowing them to set a price that may be detrimental to other, longer-term
investors when trading resumes.
HFT could also pose other problems for financial stability, in addition to liquidity
shortages. The influx of high frequency traders into the equities markets has arguably
increased aggregate uninformed demand for stocks, which may result in the failure of
pricing mechanisms for stocks, potentially fuelling the asset bubbles that often serve as
precursors to a crisis.223 In addition, given the technological and real estate advantages
needed to successfully compete in the HFT space,224 it would not be surprising if there is
a trend towards consolidation of trading amongst a small number of market players.
Trading might also consolidate if non-HFT market participants deem the equities markets
unfair because of the advantages available to high frequency traders, and either stop trading
or permanently decamp to dark trading venues where HFT firms cannot see their orders.
If either of these eventualities were to occur, then the remaining market participants in the
lit equities markets would become particularly systemically important, in terms of
providing liquidity. In other words, the remaining market participants could achieve "too
big to fail" status, which might incentivize them to act more recklessly, knowing that
government assistance would likely be forthcoming if they were on the brink of failure. 226
D. The Casefor PrioritizingFinancialStability
The rise of HFT thus poses challenges for all of the SEC's mandates, and remedial
actions taken to promote one mandate may ultimately end up impeding another mandate. 227
In the past, investor protection has often won out as the SEC's paramount concern.228 As
former SEC Chair Mary Schapiro noted, "if there were to be a conflict between, for

220. Even when a circuit breaker is not tripped, merely approaching it may exacerbate volatility because
traders panic and seek to conclude their trades just in case trading is stopped. Hope & Strumpf, supra note 217.
221. Id.; Luis M. Aguilar, Comm'r, SEC, Evolving Equity Markets Require Constant Attention (Oct. 27,
2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/aguilar-emsac-10-2015.html [hereinafter Aguilar, Evolving Equity
Markets].
222. DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at 173.
223. IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 25, at 19. For a discussion of the potentially destabilizing
effects of increased demand, see Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market
Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 679 (1995).
224. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
225. IOSCO HFT REPORT, supra note 122, at 29.
226. Hilary J. Allen, Let's Talk About Tax: Fixing Bank Incentives to Sabotage Stability, 18 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 821, 880 (2013).
227. The relative trade-offs that HFT poses for the SEC's goals of investor protection and capital formation
have been thoroughly explored by Fox et al., supra note 129.
228. Guttentag, supra note 69, at 212.
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example, investor protection and efficient markets, the debate would be settled by asking
the question I have posted on the door to my office: 'How does it help investors?"' 22
However, this Article argues that-with respect to HFT at least-when mandates seem to
conflict, the SEC should prioritize financial stability over the protection of individual
investors, and over short-term capital formation as well. Part V.E's analysis of the SEC's
communications on HFT, while not conclusive on this point, raises the possibility that the
SEC may have been trending in this direction during the Obama administration. This
Article has already touched on the social costs associated with a financial crisis-avoiding
these costs is in and of itself justification for prioritizing financial stability.230 But in
addition, financial stability is also the best way to protect investors collectively, and
promote longer-term capital formation.
Investors, as a collective group with diversified portfolios of equity securities, would
suffer significantly from a systemic failure that impacts market-wide returns.231 As such,
regulation that seeks to promote the stability of the equity markets is salutary from both an
investor protection and a financial stability perspective. However, it is possible that
regulation of HFT could increase execution costs and lower execution speed during normal
times, and in this respect, the SEC's goals of financial stability and investor protection
could diverge in the short-term.
On a systemic scale, increased costs and lower speed could also be problematic for
capital formation in the short-term, making trading more expensive and thus reducing
liquidity. However, regulators should think critically about the quality of the liquidity that
HFT provides: liquidity is not an end in itself. Its continuing availability (like financial
stability more broadly) is a regulatory goal because it is a precondition for broader
economic growth.232 In good times, further increases in liquidity in the equities markets
provide diminishing marginal returns for the broader economy.233 In bad times, when the
markets are most in need of liquidity, there is no guarantee of the continuing availability
of liquidity provided by high frequency traders.234 It has therefore been argued that

229. Schapiro, Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals, supra note 77. In a similar vein, Arthur
Levitt, who was SEC Chair in 1998, concluded a speech with the words, "Investor protection is our legal mandate.
Investor protection is our moral responsibility. Investor protection is my top personal priority." Arthur Levitt,

Chairman, SEC, A Question of Integrity: Promoting Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading (Feb. 27,
1998); As recently as January 2017, Mary Jo White stressed that "investor protection must be paramount." Mary

Jo White, Chairman, SEC, The Economic Club of New York: The SEC after the Financial Crisis: Protecting
Investors, Preserving Markets (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/the-sec-after-the-financial-

crisis.html [hereinafter White, SEC after the Financial Crisis].
230. See supra Part III.C.
231. Allen, Mandates and Structure, supra note 73, at 1117 (citing John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 54 (2014)).

232.

Pasquale, supranote 97, at 2091.

233. "[T~he benefits of market liquidity must, like the benefits of any market completion, be of declining
marginal utility as more market liquidity is attained. The additional benefits deliverable, for instance, by the extra

liquidity which derives from flash or algorithmic training, exploiting price divergences present for a fraction of a
second, must be of minimal value compared to the benefits from having an equity market which is reasonably
liquid on a day-by-day basis." Adair Turner, What Do Banks Do, What Should They Do and What Public Policies
Are Needed to Ensure Best Results for the Real Economy?, CASS Bus. SCH. 27 (Mar. 17, 2010),
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/at_17marl0.pdf.

234.

See supra Part V.C.
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[a] somewhat higher cost for the provision of market liquidity during the more
benign stages of a financial cycle might be worthwhile if it were accompanied
by less volatility and stress when the cycle inevitably turned down. In fact, even
if market liquidity costs are now going to be higher on average, this might be a
small price to pay for a much more stable financial sector. 235
The promotion of financial stability should therefore be a priority as the SEC engages in
equity market structure reform-and as the next Part demonstrates, it has indeed been a
priority for the reform effort so far.
E. Market StructureReforms Related to High Frequency Trading
The SEC's latest round of market structure reform began with the 2010 Concept
Release.236 This Concept Release includes a discussion of the potential risks posed to the
market system by HFT, 37 and since its issuance, the SEC has finalized a number of rules
that directly address market stability issues. These include Rule 15c3-5 (known as the
Market Access Rule), which seeks to improve risk management systems at broker-dealers
who operate, or provide direct access to, alternative trading systems (including dark
pools);238 amended Rule 15c6-1(a), which shortens the settlement period for most brokerdealer transactions; Rule 13h-1, which allows for the identification and tracking of socalled "large traders";239 and Rule 613, which aims to create a consolidated audit trail for
240
the routing and execution of all orders submitted in NMS securities.
To elaborate, the SEC release announcing the adoption of the final Market Access
Rule states that "[n]ew Rule 15c3-5 is designed to ensure that broker-dealers appropriately
control the risks associated with market access, so as not to jeopardize their own financial
condition, that of other market participants, the integrity of trading on the securities
markets, and the stability of the financial system." 24 1 When amending Rule 15c6-1 (a) to
adopt a two day settlement cycle, the SEC noted its express intention that the change will
lead to a reduction "in credit, market, and liquidity risk, and as a result, a reduction in
systemic risk for U.S. market articipants," noting that these benefits "will be distributed
across the financial system."22 The release relating to Rule 13h-1 notes that "[t]he large
trader reporting requirements are designed to provide the Commission with a valuable
source of useful data to support its investigative and enforcement activities, as well as
facilitate the Commission's ability to assess the impact of large trader activity on the
securities markets, to reconstruct trading activity following periods of unusual market

235. Dudley, Market and Funding Liquidity, supra note 28.
236. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594 (Jan. 21, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 242).
237. Id. at 63.
238. Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,792 (Nov. 15,
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
239. Large Trader Reporting, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,960 (Aug. 3, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
240. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,722 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
241. Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,792.
242. Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 82 Fed. Reg. 15,564 (Mar. 29, 2017) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240).
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volatility, and to analyze significant market events for regulatory purposes." 243 While the
Federal Register entry relating to the adoption of the Consolidated Audit Trail Rule (Rule
613) does not expressly refer to issues of stability or systemic risk, other SEC
communications relating to the CAT make clear its potential as an important tool for
stability regulation. Commissioner Stein, for example, has said:
The Flash Crash and other events in our markets demonstrate the need for CAT.
Only through a consolidated audit trail can we truly know what is happening in
our marketplace, with trading activity cascading across multiple trading venues
and asset classes. The linkages, complexity, and fragmentation of our markets
outstrip the current ability to monitor, analyze, and interpret market events. Only
through CAT can we develop regulations that are truly driven by facts. Only
through CAT can regulators appropriately survey our high-speed and highvolume marketplace.2 4 4
Perhaps the most prominent reform of market structure regulation in the past few years
has been the SEC's adoption of Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (SCI),4 to
"strengthen the technology infrastructure of the U.S. securities markets.
In adopting
Regulation SCI as a final rule in November 2014, the SEC noted that "[s]ince Regulation
SCI's proposal in March 2013, additional systems problems among market participants
have occurred, further underscoring the importance of bolstering the robustness of U.S.
market infrastructure to help ensure its stability, integrity, and resiliency."247 To that end,
Regulation SCI imposes new compliance obligations on specified market infrastructure

.

providers (referred to as SCI entities),248 including obligations to adopt policies (and
regularly review and report compliance with such policies) to ensure their systems have
the "capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security adequate to maintain their
operational capability and promote the maintenance of fair and orderly market."249 SCI
entities will also be required to "mandate participation by designated members or
participants in scheduled testing of the operation of their business continuity and disaster
recovery plans, including backup systems, and to coordinate such testing on an industryor sector-wide basis with other SCI entities" and "take corrective action with res ect to . .
systems disruptions, systems compliance issues, and systems intrusions". 25 In some
circumstances, SCI entities will be required to notify the SEC and certain market

243.

Large Trader Reporting, 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,960.

244.

Stein, Dominance of Data, supra note 205.

245. Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, 79 Fed. Reg. 72,252 (Dec. 5, 2014) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249).
246. SEC Spotlight: Regulation SCI, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/regulation-sci.shtml (last visted
Feb. 9, 2018).
247. Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, 79 Fed. Reg. at 72,254.
248. "Regulation SCI will apply to operators of certain alternative trading systems ("ATSs"), market data
information providers and clearing agencies, in addition to national securities exchanges." Annette L. Nazareth
et al., SEC Adopts Regulation SCI to Strengthen Securities Market Infrastructure, HARV. L. SCHOL. F. CORP.

GOVERNANCE & FiN. REG. (Jan. 7, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/07/sec-adopts-regulation-scito-strengthen-securities-market-infrastructure/.

249.
250.

Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, 79 Fed. Reg. at 72,252.
Id.

The Journalof CorporationLaw

752

[Vol. 43:4

participants of such events. 25 1
While Regulation SCI is by no means perfect (for example, it does not reach a
significant portion of HFT activity),252 it is a step that is squarely aimed at maintaining the
stability and orderly functioning of the securities markets. The same is true for other recent
market structure reforms that the SEC has coordinated with self-regulatory organizations
like the NYSE, NASDAQ, and FINRA, including rules prohibiting "stub quotes,"253 and
a so-called "limit up-limit down," or "LULD" mechanisms, implemented to "prevent[]
trades in individual exchange-listed equity securities from occurring outside of a specified
price band."254 In addition, following the Flash Crash, uniform circuit breakers that "halt
trading in all exchange-listed securities throughout the U.S. markets" were updated to
"lower the percentage-decline threshold for tri gering a market-wide trading halt and
shorten the amount of time that trading is halted." ss Comments by former SEC Chair Mary
Schapiro make clear that such changes were primarily prompted by concerns about
volatility and market stability
[t]he initiatives we approved are the product of a significant effort to devise a
sophisticated, yet workable and effective way to protect our markets from
excessive volatility . . . In today's complex electronic markets, we need an

automated and appropriately calibrated way to pause or limit trading if prices
move too far too fast.2 56
Since the aforementioned rules and initiatives were finalized, a number of new rules
have been proposed by the SEC, but not yet adopted, that potentially lay the groundwork
for future financial stability regulation. One such rule proposes revamping the regulation
of alternative trading systems (including dark pools) in light of the SEC's concerns "that
the current regulatory requirements relating to operational transparency for ATSs,
particularly those that execute trades in NMS stocks, may no longer fully meet the goals
of furthering the public interest and protecting investors."257 Another proposal has been
made to limit the ability of broker-dealers to seek exemptions from requirements to belong

251. Id.
252. Nazareth et al., supra note 248 ("[D]espite the reported urging of two Commissioners, Regulation SCI
will not apply to broker-dealers operating high-volume proprietary trading platforms.").
253. Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves New Rules Prohibiting Market Maker Stub Quotes (Nov. 8, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-216.htm.
A stub quote is an offer to buy or sell a stock at a price so far away from the prevailing market that
it is not intended to be executed, such as an order to buy at a penny or an offer to sell at $100,000

[... ] "By prohibiting stub quotes, we are reducing the risk that trades will be executed at irrational
prices, and then need to be broken, if the markets become volatile," said SEC Chairman Mary L.
Schapiro. Id.
254. Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves Proposals to Address Extraordinary Volatility in Individual Stocks
1,
2012),
(Jun.
Market
Stock
and
Broader
https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171482422.
255. Id.
256. Id. Notably, there is no reference to investor protection or capital formation in the press release
announcing the new rules.

257. Regulation ofNMS Stock Alternative Trading Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 80,998 (Dec. 28, 2015) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249).
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to a registered national securities association258 (this proposal is intended to enhance
regulatory oversight of HFT firms). 259 Finally, the SEC has proposed a rule intended to
improve disclosures made by broker-dealers regarding order routing, because
[T]he Commission preliminarily believes that the complexity of order execution
algorithms and smart order routing systems, and the multiplicity of venues to
which broker-dealers may route orders or send actionable indications of interest,
have made it increasingly difficult for institutional customers to assess the impact
particular order routing strategies may have on the quality of their executions, or
the risks presented by any resulting information leakage or broker-dealer
conflicts of interest. 260
These latter three proposals do not mention financial stability or systemic risk, but by
allowing for greater oversight and transparency of the equity markets, they may
nonetheless lay the groundwork for future financial stability regulation by the SEC. 261
Notwithstanding the volume of rule-making to date, the SEC's market structure
reform project is still very much a work in progress. The Equity Market Structure Advisory
Committee, established in January 2015 to assist the SEC in addressing the more
fundamental policy questions associated with market structure reform,262 continues to meet
and its work is ongoing (the Committee's charter has been renewed until August 2017).263
As such, the SEC can make further contributions to financial stability as it continues to
engage in market structure reform.
F. SEC Communications Relating to High Frequency Trading
The purpose of this Part is to try and discern from the SEC's public communications
whether the SEC is in fact considering financial stability-not in a prudential sense, or a
static sense, but as such term is broadly defined in Part I-as it explores potential
regulatory reforms relating to HFT. While it is true that public communications may not
always convey the true motivations of SEC personnel,264 attempting to discern the desired
public message is nevertheless a valuable undertaking that can suggest much about the
SEC's current perspectives on market structure reform, and about how such reform might
progress in the future. As Langevoort has noted, "[b]oth common experience and

258. Exemption for Certain Exchange Members, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,036 (proposed Apr. 2, 2015) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
259. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Rule to Require Broker-Dealers Active in Off-Exchange Market to
Association
(Mar.
25,
2015),
of
National
Securities
Become
Members
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-48.html.
260. Disclosure of Order Handling Information, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,432 (July 27, 2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 242).
261. See infra notes 321, 322 and accompanying text.
262. White, Enhancing Our Equity Market, supra note 138.
263. Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Renew Equity Market Structure Advisory Committee (Nov. 19,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-249.html.
264.

There are many interesting and valuable frames through which to examine the motivations of SEC

personnel, including partisan politics, public choice theory, and behavioral economics. These frames are largely
beyond the scope of this article, but for an excellent discussion of the various ways in which to analyze the internal
workings of the SEC. See Langevoort, SEC as a Lawmaker, supra note 40, at 1597.
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bureaucratic theory teach that organizations will often develop attachments to rhetoric,
which rhetoric then becomes increasingly influential in molding the later behavior of the
agency."265 Put differently, the words that members of an agency choose to use in public
communications matter, and may shape future agency policy, "especially in an
environment characterized (as with the SEC) by rapid turnover of key personnel." 266
A full list of the communications reviewed can be found at Appendix A. This list
includes all of the testimony, public statements and speeches by SEC commissioners and
senior staff members, as well as press releases issued by the SEC, that were published
between January 2010 and January 2017267 which not only mention HFT, but also include
some substantive discussion of the practice, or market structure reform more generally. 268
Each of the documents reviewed was manually searched for references to permutations of
several rhetorically significant key phrases: "investor protection", "capital formation" and
"stability"/"systemic risk." The words "investor protection" were chosen as keywords
because they appear frequently in the securities statutes and in the SEC's own formulation
of its mandate, and because SEC personnel are usually quite forthright in noting their
concerns about investor protection using those exact words.269 The phrase "capital
formation" is similarly found in both the SEC's self-described mission, and the securities
statutes.270 The words "stability" and "systemic risk" were selected as these are the words
generally used post-crisis to denote a regulatory focus on avoiding failure of the financial
In addition to being searched for keywords, each of the documents in Appendix
system.
A was read in its entirety to determine if, even in the absence of a particular keyword, there
was any substantive discussion of issues pertaining to investor protection, capital formation
or stability.
Of the 107 documents reviewed, 93 made some allusion to investor protection issues,
71 made some allusion to capital formation, and 67 made some allusion to the stability of
the equities markets or the financial system as a whole.272 This rough analysis indicates

265.

Langevoort, SEC as a Bureaucracy, supra note 96, at 532.

266.

Id. at 533. As Dombalagian notes, "seasoned regulators may be inclined to rely excessively on

assumptions built up through years of professional education and training", particularly when new technologies
are involved. DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at 33.

267.

The year 2010 is not an arbitrary starting point for this exercise: the publication of the Concept Release

in January 2010 marked the beginning of the SEC's latest foray into market structure issues, and interest in such
issues intensified upon the occurrence of the Flash Crash in May 2010. Interest in HFT from other global

regulators also piqued around this same time. See IOSCO HFT REPORT, supra note 122, at 21-22.
268.

Documents that merely speak to market turmoil or reform projects more generally were excluded from

the analysis, as were documents with only a passing reference to the administrative aspects of, or budgeting for,
the market structure reform project.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70. See also Guttentag, supra note 69, at 212-18, for the
frequency with which such words are invoked.
270. See supratext accompanying note 70.

271.

Allen, What is FinancialStability, supra note 1, at 933-34.

272. Of the 116 documents reviewed, 71 used a permutation of the key phrase "investor protection", and of
the 47 documents that did not include that phrase, 33 either mentioned concepts similar to "fairness" or included

a substantive discussion of investor protection issues. 56 documents used a permutation of the words "capital
formation," and of the 63 documents that did not include that phrase, 20 either mentioned concepts similar to
"efficiency" or included a substantive discussion of promoting capital formation. Finally, while only 41

documents used a permutation of the keywords "stability"/"systemic risk," 30 other documents mentioned the
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that investor protection continues to be a priority for the SEC as it approaches HFT, a
conclusion that is aligned with the SEC's self-conception as primarily an investor
protection regulator273 (although admittedly, these communications do not generally
provide much clarity as to which investors-retail or institutional- the SEC is focused
on.) However, it is also clear that capital formation and financial stability were by no means
ignored. Interestingly, mentions of capital formation and efficiency-which the SEC has a
clear statutory mandate to pursue-were roughly on par with mentions of stability (which
has a less solid legislative foundation as an SEC goal).274 Of course, noting the incidence
of keywords-or incidences of substantive discussion of a topic-can only tell us so much.
While such numbers can serve as a very rough proxy for the amount of attention being
accorded a particular issue, it is necessary to move beyond the keywords to a more thorough
reading of the documents reviewed if we wish to evaluate the depth of the SEC's
commitment to stability.
A close reading of those documents indicates that the SEC Commissioners who have
identified as either Independent or Democratically-affiliated have made significant
mention of "stability" in their communications regarding HFT-these commissioners also
tend to include significant discussion of investor protection in their communications.
During their respective tenures at the SEC, Chairs Mary Schapiro and Mary Jo White, as
well as Commissioners Luis Aguilar and Kara Stein, have all demonstrated commitment
to addressing stability issues when dealing with market structure reform. Illustrative quotes
include the following:
* Over the past few years, all financial regulators have been faced with key
issues of systemic risk and financial stability. At the SEC, our activities
have included a broad-based appraisal of both the strengths and
weaknesses of our current equity market structure, and our capacity to
monitor trading across all trading venues and to enforce the securities
laws and regulations and self-regulatory organization (SRO) rules. 275
* We appreciate the technological changes that make markets more
efficient, reduce costs, and increase liquidity. But when these changes
have the potential to destabilize markets without significantly
contributing to key market functions, we believe they deserve a second
look. 276

* It falls to the SEC to ensure that the rules governing market structure and
market participant behavior foster fair, reliable and resilient markets that
warrant the full confidence of investors and listed companies. 277

"robustness" or "resilience" of the equities markets, or otherwise included a substantive discussion of market
stability or systemic risk.
273.

Langevoort, SEC as a Lawmaker, supra note 40, at 1625.

274.

See supra Part IB.

275.

Oversight of Dodd-Frank Implementation: Monitoring Systemic Risk and Promoting Financial

Stability: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 60 (2011) (testimony of Mary
L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC).
276.

Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the Stanford University Law School Directors College

(Jun. 20, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spchO62010mls.htm.
277. Schapiro, Strengthening Our Equity, supra note 179.
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Given their volume and access, high frequency trading firms have a
tremendous capacity to affect the stability and integrity of the equity
markets. Currently, however, high frequency trading firms are subject to
very little in the way of obligations either to protect that stability by
promoting reasonable price continuity in tough times, or to refrain from
exacerbating price volatility . . . An out-of-control algorithm not only
can cause serious losses to the firm that uses it, it can also cause severe
trading disruptions that harm market stability and shake investor
confidence.
* But perhaps the strongest message from the Knight Capital episode is
that the party committing an error may very well end up bearing a
massive financial loss. That, more than anything, sends a wake-up call
to the entire industry. Nonetheless, our concern is not whether a single
firm might fail, but whether it causes collateral damage to investors and
their confidence in the integrity and stability of our markets. 279
* Regulation SCI mandates comprehensive new controls to strengthen key
technological systems, promoting more transparency, resiliency and
accountability. 280
* An area of particular focus is the use of aggressive, destabilizing trading
strategies in vulnerable market conditions, when they could most
seriously exacerbate price volatility. While the volatility moderators
already put in place impose outside limits on price moves, even moves
within those limits can be damaging. Instability arising during a broad
market event may simultaneously affect hundreds or thousands of stocks,
triggering many trading pauses and reopenings over a short period of
time.281

* I believe that the goal of reducing systemic risk is a central tenet of the
SEC's long-standing mission.282
* The proliferation of algorithmic trading has resulted in a more
anonymous trading environment, where market participants may be
more acutely focused on short-term gains than was the case in the past.
In such circumstances, market participants may be more likely to
withdraw their liquidity during periods of market stress, leaving markets
283
more prone to severe bouts of illiquidity.
* I am growing increasingly concerned about the stability of our market
278. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the Security Traders Association (Sep. 22, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch092210mis.htm.
279. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Introductory Remarks at SEC's Market Technology Roundtable
(Oct. 2, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171491354.
280. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Chairman's Address at SEC Speaks 2015 (Feb. 20, 2015)
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2015-spchO22015mjw.html.
281.

282.
283.
the

White, Enhancing Our Equity Market, supra.note 138.

White, SEC after the Financial Crisis, supranote 229.
Luis M. Aguilar, Comm'r, SEC, Public Statement: Ere Misery Made Me Wise - The Need to Revisit
Regulatory
Framework
of
the
U.S.
Treasury
Market
(July
14,
2015)

https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/need-to-revisit--regulatory-framework-us-treasury-market.html.
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structure as we lurch from one crisis to another, be it the flash crash or
the Knight trading fiasco. Today, I plan to focus on the dangers that
investors face from a trading market structure that has shown too many
signs of weakness and instability. 284
* The Flash Crash and other events in our markets demonstrate the need
for CAT. Only through a consolidated audit trail can we truly know what
is happening in our marketplace, with trading activity cascading across
multiple trading venues and asset classes. The linkages, complexity, and
fragmentation of our markets outstrip the current ability to monitor,
analyze, and interpret market events. Only through CAT can we develop
regulations that are truly driven by facts. Only through CAT can
regulators appropriately survey our high-speed and high volume
marketplace.
* Despite everyone's best efforts, computers are going to fail; software is
going to malfunction; and human errors will continue. "Bugs" and
"glitches" cannot be fully eradicated. However, we can and should find
ways to minimize the impact of these problems on our larger financial
system. Technology disruptions and failures erode confidence and trust
in our markets. We need to all work together to make our securities
markets more reliable and resilient when such inevitable disturbances
occur. Stable and reliable markets give investors around the world the
confidence to invest. Those investments help our nation's businesses
grow, prosper, and create jobs for millions for Americans. Those
investments help Americans buy homes, save for retirement, and pay for
their children's educations. When investor trust waivers, so does the
well-being of our entire economy.285
* We have to understand what the computers are doing in order to respond
quickly and effectively to disruptions. Failure to do so can create
additional risk to the financial system. 286
Communications from Republican-affiliated former and current Commissioners,
while often highly critical of the FSOC and the rhetorical term "financial stability," 287
nonetheless indicate something of a commitment to orderly markets and market stability.
For example, former Commissioner Daniel Gallagher stated in one speech:
For the past several years, banking regulators and others have attempted to graft
their systemic risk mandate on to the SEC's own or otherwise dragoon the agency
into the already broad group of systemic risk regulators. This is as unwise as it

284. Luis M. Aguilar, Comm'r, SEC, Addressing Market Instability Through Informed and Smart
Regulation, Speech at Practicing Law Institute's SEC Speaks in 2013 Program, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 22,2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spchO22213laahtm [hereinafter Aguilar, Addressing Market Instability].
285. Kara M. Stein, Comm'r, SEC, Public Statement on Regulation Systems Compliance & Integrity (SCI)
(Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/spchl I l914kms.

286.

Kara M. Stein, Comm'r, SEC, Statement on the Joint Industry Plan on the Consolidated Audit Trail

("CAT") (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/stein-statement-open-meeting287. See supra notes 59-61.
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is impractical.
That being said, I believe that by faithfully carrying out our mandate to protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation in the fixed income markets, we can address some of the underlying
systemic risk arising in those markets. 288
In another speech, Commissioner Michael Piwowar indicated that market glitches
should not be the sole focus of market structure reform, but implied that the orderly
functioning of equity markets infrastructure is an appropriate subject for regulatory review:
A review cannot be focused narrowly on what may have caused the most recent
market disruption or trading "glitch." Instead, it is imperative that a market
structure review cover a much larger scope. Topics we must consider include,
but are not limited to, market infrastructure (i.e., technology and
interconnectivity of market centers), the classification and treatment of different
types of market participants, undisplayed liquidity, exchange pricing models,
off-exchange trading, self-regulatory organization oversight, and a Regulation
289
NMS "regulatory lookback."
The commitment of Gallagher and Piwowar to financial stability should not be
overstated: their communications suggest that they prioritize efficiency and capital
formation first and foremost.290 Nonetheless, it is a positive sign that these Commissioners
have been willing to concede that SEC regulation can make some contribution to the
orderly functioning of the equities markets, and thus the financial system as a whole, even
though they may resist labeling such efforts as "financial stability regulation."
Given that it has been argued that "the senior staff [of the SEC] are the real loci of
policy formulation" in the agency,291 it is also worth looking at communications from
senior SEC staff members on the subject of HFT. Unsurprisingly, Andrew Ceresney, the
SEC's former Director of Enforcement, tended to focus on investor protection issues when
discussing HFT.292 However, even in the context of enforcement, the subject of market
stability came up. In discussing recent enforcement actions in November 2015, Ceresney
noted that:
The case against Latour, and the others I mentioned, deliver important
messages. First, firms with market access must have controls over their

288.

Gallagher, Remarks to the Georgetown University Center, supra note 59.

289. Michael S. Piwowar, Comm'r, SEC, Speech on The Benefit of Hindsight and the Promise of Foresight:
A
Proposal
for
A
Comprehensive
Review
of
Equity
Market
Structure
(2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spchl2013msp.
290. See, e.g., Michael S. Piwowar, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks at AEl Conference on Financial Stability (July

15, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spchO7l5l4msp; Gallagher, Remarks to the Georgetown
University Center, supra note 59; Gallagher, SEC's Rulemaking Agenda, supra note 60.
291.

Langevoort, SEC as a Lawmaker, supra note 40, at 1604.

292. See, e.g., Andrew Ceresney, Dir. Div. Enft, SEC, Keynote Address at Compliance Week 2014 (May
20, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spchO52014ajc; Andrew Ceresney, Dir. Div. Enft, SEC,
Market Structure Enforcement: Looking Back and Forward: Speech at SIFMA Compliance & Legal Society New

York Regional Seminar (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-speech-sifma-ny-regionalseminar.html [hereinafter Ceresney, Market Structure Enforcement].
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automated trading systems and, when designing those controls, have safeguards
in place that anticipate mistakes and limit the harm they can cause. Second, nonfraud market structure violations can have severe consequence. ISO violations,
for example, can cause other market participants who followed the law to lose
executions that they otherwise might have received. And the Knight case had
significant market impact beyond the effect on Knight itself.293
As might be expected, the majority of staff communications on the topic of HFT
emanate from the SEC's Division of Trading and Markets. In Congressional testimony,
former Director of the Division Stephen Luparello stated:
One of the most serious concerns about highly electronic markets is the risk of
instability and disruption. Sophisticated technology tools can enhance efficiency,
but they also can facilitate the rapid onset of a trading disruption. These
disruptions can arise when systems that drive algorithmic trading fail or
malfunction, and also when high-speed trading leads to sudden gaps between
liquidity demand and supply that can cause extreme price volatility. Addressing
the risk of instability and disruption from these two sources has been a high
priority of the SEC in recent years and will continue to be a focus in 2016.294
Communications regarding HFT from Gregg Berman, former Associate Director of
the Division of Trading and Markets, were also firmly grounded in concerns about market
stability issues. His speeches about the equities markets are highly technical discussions of
how such markets work, focusing on their complexities, automation and
interconnectedness, and the need to prioritize continuing liquidity in such markets,295 but
his ultimate concern seemed to be about ensuring continuing market stability. In one
speech, Berman noted that, "I believe that a market structure that can support the
requirements of a consolidated audit trail will necessarily be more robust and provide
participants with more confidence, even during extreme events." 296
Berman tended to shy away from using the keywords "investor protection" and
"capital formation" that are sprinkled so liberally through the other SEC communications
on HFT, but other staff members of the Division of Trading and Markets deployed them
more often. James Brigagliano, former Deputy Director of the Division of Trading and
Markets, appears to have focused more on balancing capital formation with investor
protection, rather than considering stability issues, when considering market structure
reform.297 James Bums, another former Deputy Director of the Division, also referred to

293.
294.

Ceresney, Market Structure Enforcement, supra note 292.
Regulatory Reforms to Improve Equity Market Structure: HearomgBefore the Subcomm. on Banking.

Hous., & Urban Affairs, I l4th Cong. (2016) (statement of Stephen Luparello, Dir. of Dic. Trading and Mkts.).
295. Gregg E. Berman, Senior Advisor to the Dir., SEC Div. of Trading & Mkts., Market Participants and
the May 6 Flash Crash, Speech at the 11th Annual SIFMA Market Structure Conference (Oct. 13, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spchl01310geb.htm [hereinafter Berman, May 6 Flash Crash]; Berman,
Market Structure: What We Know, supra note 214; Berman, Transformational Technologies, supra note 151;

Gregg E. Berman, Assoc. Dir., Off. of Analytics and Research, What Drives the Complexity and Speed of our
Markets?, Speech at the North American Trading Architecture Summit (Apr. 15, 2014),
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See Berman, May 6 Flash Crash, supra note 295.
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the keywords "investor protection" and "capital formation" in a speech given in February
2013, but he expressed an overriding concern with the continuing integrity of the markets,
and their ability to inspire confidence in investors.298 Finally, one other key SEC staff
member has discussed HFT on a number of occasions-Carlo di Florio, the former
National Exam Program Director. His communications indicate that Di Florio was
primarily concerned with unfair market practices, but he also discussed the problems of
market volatility. 299
From the foregoing analysis, it seems that many high-profile members of the SEC's
staff, as well as its Commissioners, have at least considered market stability issues as they
approached market structure reform-even if financial stability was not always their
number one priority. Many of the press releases issued by the SEC that mention HFT tell
a similar story-press releases announcing a proposal for the consolidated audit trail, 300
the adotion of the market access rule,301 an international roundtable on market structure
issues, 2 a market technology roundtable,303 enforcement actions against Knight Capital
and Latour Capital,304 and a proposal for increased regulation of high frequency traders, 305
all make at least some mention of the importance of protecting the stability of the equities
markets.
That said, there has been almost complete turnover of SEC Commissioners and senior
Enforcement and Trading & Markets staff with the incoming Trump administration. The
majority of the Commissioners appointed by the new Trump administration could well be

Pool

Symposium (Jan. 21, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch01211 Ojab.htm; James A.
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Professionals (Apr. 19, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch04l91Ojab.htm.
James R. Bums, Deputy Dir., Div. ofTrading and Mkts, Introductory Remarks at the SEC's Roundtable
298.

on Decimalization (Feb. 5, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spchO20513jrbhtm.
299. Carlo V. di Florio, Dir., Off. of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Remarks at the 2010 NSCP
National Meeting (Nov. 1, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spchll0110cvd.htm;
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Florio, Remarks at the IA Watch Annual IA Compliance Best Practices Seminar (Mar. 21, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/201 I/spch032 111 cvd.htm.

300.
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2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-86.htm.
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https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-21 0.htm.
302.
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2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/201 1/2011 -209.htm.
303. Press Release, SEC, SEC to Host Market
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8, 2012),

https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-153htm.

304. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Knight Capital With Violations of Market Access Rule (Oct. 16,
2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2013-222; Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges N.Y.-Based High
Frequency Trading Firm With Violating Net Capital Rule For Broker-Dealers: $16 Million Penalty Is Largest
Ever for Net Capital Rule Violations (Sep. 17, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-199; Press
Release, SEC, Latour Trading Charged With Market Structure Rule Violations: High-Frequency Trading Firm to
Pay More Than $8 Million to Settle Charges (Sep. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015221.html.
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more ideologically aligned with the SEC's "capital formation" mandate and the end goal
of efficiency, and prefer to avoid implementing any regulation that could be seen as costly
for the industry, or slowing down the process of price formation and provision of liquidity
by high frequency traders.306 However, because the costs of financial crises-both
quantifiable monetary costs as well as more diffuse social costs-are so catastrophic, 307
this Article urges incoming commissioners and staff members to emulate the SEC's
approach of the last seven years, and affirm that the promotion of financial stability is one
of the SEC's core functions. It was perhaps in a similar spirit of admonishment that
outgoing SEC Chief Mary Jo White said, in the last speech of her tenure, "I believe that
the goal of reducing systemic risk is a central tenet of the SEC's long-standing mission." 308
VI. ADOPTING A FINANCIAL STABILITY-INFORMED APPROACH TO HIGH FREQUENCY
TRADING REGULATION

As the SEC's Equity Market Structure Reform project continues, there are a number
of steps the SEC could take to help mitigate the risks that HFT poses for financial stability.
This Part will survey some of the proposals that have already been made to this end, as
well as considering possible cutting-edge technological reforms that the SEC might avail
itself of in the future. Before going any further, though, it is worth acknowledging that
some of the systemic risks associated with HFT would best be addressed using prudential
regulation. For example, if a technological arms race amongst HFT firms results in a much
more concentrated group of "too big to fail" traders, then those firms might need to be the
subject of prudential regulation that aims to prevent them from being highly susceptible to
collapse. However (and in keeping with the rest of this Article), this Part will restrict its
focus to equity market structure reform-many of the most salient financial stability
concerns associated with HFT would be better addressed by market regulation, and the
SEC is likely to be more comfortable taking this type of action than implementing
prudential regulation.
The most extreme market-based approach to addressing the problems associated with
HFT would be to ban the practice altogether, so that other market participants come to rely
on other sources of market liquidity. 309 Even if desirable, however, crafting and enforcing
such a ban would be difficult for the SEC.310 Such a ban would have to include definitions
306. Lin, supra note 181, at 692. For proponents of free markets, the practical takeaway from the position
that equities markets are semi-strong efficient is that so long as a level informational playing field is created, the
markets will generate the best possible outcomes without further regulatory interference. DAVID M. DRIESEN,
THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW 83-84 (2012); see also DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76,

at 23.
307. Allen, A New Philosophy, supra note 91, at 178.
308. White, SEC after the Financial Crisis, supra note 229.
309. If HFT were not responsible for providing the majority of liquidity to the equity markets, regulators
would not have to worry about the sudden withdrawal of high frequency traders from the market causing such
liquidity to evaporate.
310. It should be noted that these types of reforms could pose some costs for capital formation in the shortterm, in that they would reduce execution speeds, as well as the amount of granular order information available
to other market participants. Matt Levine, High-Speed Traders Still Trading Fasterthan Low-Speed Traders,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Mar. 18, 2014, 1:20 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-03-18/highspeed-traders-still-trading-faster-than-low-speed-traders. In the longer term, however, any rule that helps ensure
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that distinguished between the panoply of ever-evolving trading strategies to be prohibited
and other algorithmic trading -strategies that cause fewer concerns from a financial stability
perspective, and which should therefore be preserved to promote market efficiency. Unless
such definitions were drafted extremely carefully and updated frequently, the ban would
be highly porous and susceptible to significant regulatory arbitrage. Given these
difficulties, policymakers who wish to eliminate HFT have instead focused on
implementing a "transaction tax": such a tax would be very small on a per-transaction basis,
but enough to erode the tiny per-transaction profits that-in the aggregate-make HFT a
lucrative strategy.311 The imposition of such a tax would be a matter for Congress rather
than the SEC, though, and while certain members of Congress have proposed
implementing such a tax, these proposals have not gained much traction in the United
States. 3 12
It is, however, open to the SEC to discourage HFT by implementing other structural
measures designed to reduce the profitability of the HFT model. Such measures might
include rules increasing the minimum pricing increment that can be used when trading
equity securities (the so-called "tick size"); 3 13 rules limiting the ability of traders to cancel
orders;314 rules requiring that "private dissemination of quote and trade information be
delayed until the exclusive processor under the Regulation NMS scheme, referred to as the
'SIP,' has publicly disseminated information from all exchanges"; 3 15 rules requiring
exchanges to hardwire latency or "speed bumps" into trade execution;316 and rules
requiring orders to be processed in batch auctions rather than continuously. 3 17 Proposals
have also been made for measures that focus directly on the continuing provision of
liquidity, rather than on making HFT less profitable. For example, in addition to deploying
emergency measures like circuit breakers when the markets are in turmoil,31 the SEC
could consider imposing legal duties on HFT firms to continue providing liquidity even
during periods of extreme volatility, similar to the duties that were applied to market-

continuing liquidity will assist with the formation of capital. See supra Part V.D.
311.

MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42078, FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAXES: IN BRIEF,

4(2015).
312.
RENA S. MILLER & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44443, HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING:
OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 13 (2016).

313. It has been argued that increased tick size "[w]ill curtail speculative and high-frequency trading by
adding 'friction' (cost) to trading, thereby favoring fundamentally oriented, long-term investors. Will increase the
incentive for stockbrokers to market shares to investors." David Weild et al., The trouble with small tick sizes:
Larger tick sizes will bring back capitalformation, jobs and investor confidence, GRANT THORNTON 4 (Sept.
2012), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-backgroundmaterials-090712-weild-article.pdf.
314. Pasquale, supra note 97, at 2110, 2119.
315. Fox et al., supra note 129, at 269.
316. The SEC has already permitted the creation of one such exchange. SEC Approves IEX Proposalto
Launch NationalExchange, Issues Interpretationon Automated Securities Prices:Stafflssues Guidanceon Speed
Bumps, SEC (June 17, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-123.html. For a survey of other
proposals to dampen the appeal of HFT strategies, see DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE, supra note 76, at
173-74; Sokol, infra note 334, at 455-64.
317. Eric B. Budish et al., The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: FrequentBatch Auctions as a Market
Design Response, 130 Q. J. ECON. 1547 (2015).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 217-22.
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makers in the past. 3 19 The SEC has also discussed implementing an anti-disruptive trading
rule "tailored to apply to active proprietary traders in short time periods when liquidity is
most vulnerable and the risk of price disruption caused by aggressive short-term trading
strategies is highest."320 The SEC will not be able to enforce any such rules against HFT
firms if it doesn't have authority over them, however: many HFT firms currently rely on
an exemption in Exchange Act Rule 15b9-1 to avoid registration with FINRA-a selfregulatory authority to which the SEC has delegated much of its oversight of market
participants. 3 21 As such, an amendment to Rule 15b9-1 requiring registration of proprietary
HFT firms (similar to the one the SEC proposed in 2015)
would be a necessary
precondition to continuing liquidity provision obligations or anti-disruptive trading
regulation.
In order to regulate the operations of HFT firms, the SEC may also wish to acquire
information about those firms' trading algorithms.323 It is open to the SEC to follow the
CFTC's lead and propose a rule that would require HFT firms to allow regulators to access
their source code,
however, HFT firms jealously guard the confidentiality of their
trading algorithms, and the CFTC's proposal has met with significant backlash from
industry members.325 Such industry concern is understandable, but it is also true that
regulatory attempts to address the systemic risks posed by HFT will be stymied if
regulators do not understand the trading that they are regulating. Measures like the FINRA
rules requiring regulated HFT firms to review and test their own algorithms will be
insufficient, 32 as market participants lack the data and perspective necessary to conduct
319. Fox et al., supra note 129, at 272.
320. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Optimizing Our Equity Market Structure: Opening Remarks at the
Inaugural Meeting of the Equity Market Structure Advisory Committee (May 13, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/optimizing-our-equity-market-structure.html.
321. Samuel Branum, SEC to Increase Oversight of High Frequency Trading Firms Under a Proposed
Amendment

to

Rule

15b9-1,
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@
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UNIV.
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(Jan.

19,

2017),

http://illinoisjltp.com/timelytech/sec-to-increase-oversight-of-high-frequency-trading-firms-under-a-proposedamendment-to-rule-15b9-1/.
322. Exemption for Certain Exchange Members, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,036 (Apr. 2, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240).
323. Even with comprehensive information about orders and trades, however, it may be difficult for the SEC
to deduce the highly sophisticated (and confidential) trading strategies being deployed by market participants
from their trading behavior. IOSCO HFT REPORT, supra note 122, at 30.
324. The original proposed rule required HFT firms to maintain "a source code repository to manage source
code access, persistence, copies of all code used in the production environment, and changes to such code . . ."
Regulation Automated Trading, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,824, 78,857 (2015). Following significant industry criticism, the
CFTC issued a Supplemental Proposal in November 2016 that was intended to
set conditions for the CFTC to request algorithmic trading source code; to reduce the number of
persons potentially subject to Reg AT's registration requirement and associated duties; to limit
potential overlap in market participants' responsibilities for pre-trade risk controls; to establish a
means by which so-called 'AT Persons' using third-party-developed algorithmic trading systems can
meet their regulatory requirements; and to refine the proposed reporting obligations of AT Persons.
CFTC Approves Supplemental Proposal for Reg AT, SIDLEY (Nov. 22, 2016),
https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2016/I l/cftc-approves-supplemental.
325. Industry members have argued that "giving the government access to their sensitive intellectual
property-the secret sauce of their algorithms-is too big a risk." Warmbrodt, supra note 130.
326. Regulatory Notice 15-09: Equity Trading Initiatives: Supervision and Control Practices for
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stress tests that might detect the systemic impact that their algorithms could have. 327
However, given that the algorithms and trading strategies used by market participants
are often obsolete within weeks or months of their creation,328 regulators are unlikely to
be able to keep up with all the nuances of such strategies, even if they are successful in
compelling HFT firms to disclose all of their code. Instead, to the extent the SEC is focused
on avoiding the evaporation of liquidity from the equity markets, it might make sense to
focus on the circumstances in which algorithms are programmed to withdraw from trading.
Given that little code is devoted to rare occurrences, trading algorithms are likely to be
much more simple, predictable, and less diversified in their responses to unusual events
than they are in their creative responses to normal trading.329 If the SEC were to promulgate
a rule that allows it to collect data about the circumstances in which HFT algorithms are
programmed to stop trading, which might face less industry resistance than a rule seeking
to compel disclosure of trading algorithms more generally, the SEC may have some success
in predicting how liquidity in the equities markets may dry up in response to a shock.
Of course, even if the SEC is able to compel the disclosure of source code, that code
will be useless to the SEC if the agency lacks the resources to process it. Indeed, financial
stability regulation in general has become an increasingly data-driven exercise, 330 and
IOSCO has noted that "[h]aving sophisticated systems or algorithms that monitor trading
and detect patterns is a necessity [for regulators] in this environment of high speed and
complex trading in order to maintain market integrity and confidence". 331 The SEC has
certainly taken some steps to bolster its data collection and analysis capacities: in the wake
of the Crisis, it formed a new Department of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) to
"integrate financial economics and rigorous data analytics into the core mission of the
SEC."332 In 2013, the SEC rolled-out the MIDAS system, which "collects and processes
both public consolidated and proprietary feeds from equity markets, as well as information
from related options and futures markets, to monitor and analyze market disruptions,
reconstruct market events, and anticipate other trends in trading." 333 The SEC also plans
to develop an ambitious Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT)334-although the project has
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330.
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stalled so far, 335 by providing a record of "every order and trade made in the [equities]
market, across venues and systems" if completed, the CAT would be very helpful to the
SEC in tracking the trading behavior of high frequency traders and participants in otherwise
opaque dark pools. 336
Going forward, proponents of the field of "RegTech"-which seeks to use technology
to improve monitoring, reporting and compliance 37_see a great capacity for machine
leaming and other sophisticated analytical tools to identify systemic risks in real time,
allowing for earlier intervention.
Advances in this interdisciplinary field could assist the
SEC in devising simulations that model the responses of HFT algorithms to shock events,
and the responses of humans (and other algorithms) to the actions of the HFT algorithms. 339
Insights from behavioral finance could be instructive in suggesting the types of cognitive
biases and herd behaviors that might inform the responses of human market participants to
market events. 340 These insights could then be combined with insights from the field of
complexity science to allow for modeling of the propagation of systemic risk: Joshua
Epstein's book AgentZero: Toward Neurocognitive Foundationsfor Generative Social
Science demonstrates the sophistication of the agent-based modeling technology now
available.341 Models can now incorporate thousands of variables, including affective,
cognitive and social dynamics between actors-with the affective, cognitive and social

reorganization to better enable its staff to use data once it is collected. Nathaniel E. Sokol, High Frequency
Litigation: SEC Responses to High Frequency Trading as a Case Study in MisplacedRegulatory Priorities, 17
COLUM. SC. & TECH. L. REv. 402, 452 (2016).
335. Commissioner Stein noted in September 2015 that "as I stand before you today, we have no
consolidated audit trail. Construction of the CAT has not yet begun. Counting internal deliberations, nearly six
years have been spent choosing someone to build the CAT." Kara M. Stein, Comm'r, SEC, Market Structure in
the 21st Century: Bringing Light to the Dark: Remarks before the Securities Traders Association's 82nd Annual
Market Structure Conference (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/stein-market-structure.html
[hereinafter Stein, Market Structure in the 21st Century]. Concerns about cybersecurity have informed industry
opposition to the CAT. Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Hacking Response Provides Road Map fbr Compromised
26,
2017),
DEALBOOK
(Sept.
Companies,
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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/business/dealbook/sec-hack.html.
336. Stein, Market Structure in the 21st Century, supra note 335.
337. Douglas W. Arner et al., FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of FinancialRegulation, 37
Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 371, 373 (2017).
338. There are an increasing range of machine learning, computational statistics, complexity and statistical
physics algorithms (such as Deep Learning) that offer the potential of powerful data mining and simulation
techniques for enhanced decision taking. See also Amer et al., supra note 337.
339. Former SEC Commissioner Aguilar called for such "Live Simulations and Robust Testing of Business
Continuity Plans for Trading Software." Aguilar, Addressing Market Instability, supra note 284.
340. In the future, RegTech models may allow for "sentiment monitoring". Walport, supra note 66. For a
discussion of "why asset markets move too much, the psychology that affects them, and the feedbacks between
them and the real economy." See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM, 131--48 (2009).
341. JOSHUA M. EPSTEIN, AGENTZERO: TOwARDS NEUROCOGNITIVE FOUNDATIONS FOR GENERATIVE

SOCIAL SCIENCE 81 (2013). "In agent modeling, we essentially build artificial societies of software individuals
who can interact directly with one another and with their environment according to simple behavioral rules."
Agent-based models have also been described as "computer models in which the behavior of agents and their
interactions are explicitly represented as decision rules mapping agents' observations onto actions." Stefano
Battiston et al., Complexity theory andfinancial regulation, 351 SC. MAG. 818, 819 (2016).
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links between such actors being scored on the strength of the link, not just its existence. 342
With this level of sophistication, the contagion of a market panic can be modeled to some
degree, 343 and one can only assume that models will become more sophisticated in the
future-ideally, so that they can also model how the implementation of regulation is likely
to alter market participants' behavior. 344
Certainly, our expectations for such simulations and models should be measuredthey are not intended to exactly predict and prevent future crises. 345 Furthermore, the
available data set for these types of exercises only goes back a few decades, limiting their
predictive capacity.346 But, these simulations can alert the SEC to some of the
vulnerabilities in the equity markets so that it can work, in advance of a future crisis, to
address those vulnerabilities through business conduct rules and organizational governance
requirements, as well as to refine the emergency measures it may need to take if ex ante
rules are not completely successful in shoring up the stability of the financial system.
Importantly, the SEC does not need to collect, process and model all of the data related
to financial stability on its own. Particularly given its perennial budget constraints, 347 the
SEC should take advantage of the work being done by the Federal Reserve and the Office
of Financial Research (OFR), 348 including the Financial Stability Monitor developed by
the OFR, which functions as "a heat map of key risk indicators" that assists in the
monitoring of-amongst other things-market risk. 349 However, before the SEC can
extract maximum benefit from these tools and from interagency collaboration more
generally, the data sharing policies of the various financial regulatory agencies need to be
harmonized 350-this is a step that the agencies should prioritize. Although some might be
dubious about the prospects of such inter-agency collaboration, data formats are likely to
become more standardized as financial regulation, both domestic and international,
requires the reporting of more and more granular data-harmonization of data reporting
could be driven as much by financial institutions (who wish to avoid having to report the
same data to different regulators in multiple formats) as by regulators. 35 1

342.
343.
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VII. CONCLUSION

This Article has explored how the rise of HFT can impact financial stability. This
Article has also set out the legislative basis for the SEC's authority to act as a financial
stability regulator. The remaining question, then, is whether the SEC will choose to use its
authority to mitigate the potential systemic impact of HFT. The SEC has, at times, lacked
confidence in its own ability to regulate market structure, but the SEC's communications
on HFT promulgated between January 2010 and January 2017 were promising. Those
communications indicated that as the SEC considered how to address the increasing
prominence of HFT, many commissioners and senior staff members were particularly
concerned with maintaining the stability of the equity markets and the financial system as
a whole. However, it is not clear whether the SEC will continue this approach during the
Trump administration.
If the SEC, under Chairman Clayton's leadership, decides to focus on capital
formation to the neglect of financial stability, then there will be a significant gap in the
financial regulatory architecture in the United States. The FSOC will have insufficient
information about what is transpiring in the equity markets, and may underestimate the
potential for events occurring there to metastasize into broader financial instability that can
have disastrous effects on the broader economy. To avoid such an outcome, the SEC should
deploy its expertise to maintain the orderly functioning of the equity markets and alert the
broader financial regulatory community to the ways in which HFT can generate and
transmit systemic risks-in particular, the vulnerabilities associated with the liquidity that
HFT provides. Importantly, such an approach does not require the SEC to act as a
prudential regulator. Instead, the SEC can contribute to the stability of the financial system
in a way that accords with its institutional identity-in its capacity as a market regulator.
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Testimony
Testimony Concerning the State of the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin.
Crisis Inquiry Comm. (Jan. 14, 2010) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC).
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the Subcomm. on CapitalMkts, Ins. and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the U.S. H.R. Comm.
on Fin. Serv. (May 11, 2010) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC).
Examining the Causes and Lessons of the May 6th Market Plunge: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban
Affairs (May 20, 2010) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC).
Testimony Concerning Oversight on International Cooperation to Modernize
FinancialRegulation: HearingBefore the U.S. S. Banking Subcomm. on Sec. & Int'l Trade
& Fin. (July 20, 2010) (statement of Kathleen L. Casey, Comm'r, SEC).
Testimony Concerning Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission:
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on Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Capital Mkt., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. (July 20,
2010) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC).
Testimony on U.S. Equity Market Structure by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the U.S. S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs & the U.S. S. PermanentSubcomm. on Investigations
(Dec. 8, 2010) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC).
Testimony of Monitoring Systemic Risk and Promoting FinancialStability: Hearing
Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs (May 12, 2011) (statement
of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC).
Testimony of Oversight of the SEC: Hearing Before the U.S. H.R. Comm. on Fin.
Servs. (May 16, 2013) (statement of Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC).
Testimony on "Oversight of the SEC's Agenda, Operations and FY 2015 Budget
Request": HearingBefore the U.S. H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs. (Apr. 29, 2014) (statement
of Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC).
Oversight of the SEC's Division of Trading and Markets: Hearing Before the
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